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THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS: 
A CRITIQUE OF KSR‘S UNWARRANTED REINTERPRETATION OF ―PERSON HAVING 
ORDINARY SKILL‖  
 
 
Andrew B. Dzeguze1 
 
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court took 
it upon itself to comment on the supposed knowledge and capacities of a 
―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ as used in 35 U.S.C. § 103.  This 
phrase is a key component of analyzing whether patents are ―obvious‖ and 
lack sufficient value to justify the award of a patent.  The perspective of a 
―person of ordinary skill in the art‖ is also used in virtually every 
meaningful standard in the field of patent law.  Despite this significance, 
the Court felt no need to engage in any sort of structural or statutory 
analysis of the phrase.  Instead, the Court at several points suggested that a 
―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ would have qualities that are not 
apparent from the plain language of the statute - such as creativity and 
insight beyond their immediate field.   
It may be that the Court did not realize that its statements regarding 
―persons having ordinary skill in the art‖ have significant implications 
both for patent cases involving obviousness and several other areas of the 
law.  Therefore, this article seeks to fill the gaps left by the Court.  By way 
of background, there is a discussion of the origins and evolution of the 
United States patent system and the development of the concept of 
―obviousness‖ over time.  An effort at statutory construction of these 
terms is then made.  The meanings so derived are then compared with the 
Court‘s statements in KSR to determine how (or if) they are consonant 
with precedent.  Finally, as KSR is the law of the land, several potential 
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results of a widespread implementation of the Court‘s views are posited so 
that the decision‘s full impact can be appreciated. 
 
 






In the recent case of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,2 the Supreme Court 
found itself contemplating the realm and scope of the considerations for a ―person having 
ordinary skill in the art.‖3  This phrase, which evolved from cases distinguishing between 
―invention‖ and ―ordinary‖ or ―mechanical‖ ―skill‖ in the nineteenth century4 and was 
enshrined in statute in the mid-twentieth,5 is a key component for determining whether an 
alleged invention, reflected in a patent claim (or a proposed claim of a patent 
application), is ―obvious‖ and therefore lacks sufficient value to justify the award of a 
patent.6  As ―obviousness‖ is one of only three fundamental reasons to find a purported 
invention wanting on the merits, 7 any change to the ―obviousness‖ standard by the 
Supreme Court can have significant impact on parties to patent litigations, persons or 
entities seeking to obtain patent protection, and those whose business interests would be 
furthered by restricting the numbers of patents granted.   
Though not discussed directly by the Supreme Court in KSR, the perspective of a 
―person of ordinary skill in the art‖ is also used to make a number of other determinations 
in the field of patents.  It is the basis on which a patent specification is analyzed to see if 
it meets the written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. 8  
Furthermore, claim terms are construed based on the understanding of a person of skill in 
                                                 
2 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).  
3 See, e.g., id. at 1740-42, 1746 (discussing both factors that support and factors that refute the 
conclusion that subject matter is not obvious to those skilled in the art).  
4 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734 (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851)); see, 
e.g., Mosler Safe & Lock Co. v. Mosler, Bahmann & Co., 127 U.S. 354, 360 (1888) (finding that 
the use of an old method to create a predictable result was ―only what would occur to a mechanic 
of ordinary skill‖).  
5 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (first passed in 1952).  
6 Id. (codifying ―non-obviousness‖ as a requirement for patentability).  
7 The other two are utility (reflected in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)) and novelty (found in 35 
U.S.C. § 102 (2006)).  These are a distinct set of considerations from whether the patent is 
technically deficient in some manner (such as a failure to comply with aspects of 35 U.S.C. § 112 
(2006)) or was acquired through fraud or inequitable conduct. 
8 Although § 112 in current form speaks to ―any person skilled in the art,‖ the standard of 
―skill‖ as shown in case law both before and after the current statute‘s enactment is the same 
―ordinary skill‖ enshrined in § 103.  See Automotive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 
501 F.3d 1274, 1282-83 (2007) (holding patent invalid for lack of enablement where general 
description ―fail[ed] to apprise one of ordinary skill how to make and use‖ the claimed 
invention); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175-76 (1852) (assessing whether 
specification was clear enough to be understood by a ―mechanic of ordinary skill‖); Woodworth 
v. Wilson, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 712, 716 (1846) (same).  




the art9 and the range of equivalents is established from the perspective of a person of 
skill in the art.10  In sum, virtually every meaningful standard in the field is predicated, to 
some degree, on properly understanding the scope and meaning of the terms ―person 
having ordinary skill in the art‖ and specifically ―ordinary skill.‖ 
 Hence, one might think that any statements as to what constitutes ―ordinary skill‖ 
or the characteristics of a ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ would begin with a 
careful analysis of the origins and uses of the terms over time, or at least make some use 
of the standard tools of statutory construction.  In KSR, however, the Court felt no need to 
engage in such an analysis.  Rather, with barely a nod to the historical foundation of the 
obviousness doctrine, 11 the Court at several points suggested that a ―person having 
ordinary skill in the art‖ would have qualities that are not apparent from the plain 
language of the statute.   
In making such statements, the KSR court redefined the phrase ―person having 
ordinary skill in the art.‖  Without citing any authority for the proposition, the Court 
introduced the idea that such persons would be motivated to take ideas from ―one field of  
endeavor‖ and make ―variations of it, either in the same field or a different one.‖12  The 
Court directed that lower courts, in analyzing the question of obviousness, ―take account 
of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
employ.‖13  Underscoring this last point, the Court stated that it was a matter of ―common 
sense‖ that ―familiar objects may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and 
in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple 
patents together like pieces of a puzzle.‖14  Indeed, the Court found, this was only logical, 
since ―[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an 
automaton.‖15 
The Court‘s failure to engage in a searching analysis of ―ordinary skill‖ and how 
it should be applied is understandable.  The issue on which certiorari was granted had 
nothing to do with the scope of this phrase.  Instead, the narrower issue was the 
                                                 
9 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).  
10 Aquatex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 479 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). 
11 KSR Int’l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1734, 1739. 
12 Id. at 1740 (emphasis added) (―When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design 
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a 
different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars 
its patentability.‖). 
13 Id. at 1741. 
14 Id. at 1742. 
15 Id.  While arguably not directly challenging the understanding of ―ordinary skill,‖ the Court 
also expanded the definition of obviousness to embrace results of actions that were ―obvious to 
try‖ in the sense that a finite number of options existed.  Id. 




appropriateness of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit‘s requirement of ―‗some 
motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings‘‖ where two or more pieces 
of prior art allegedly indicate the obviousness of a claimed invention.  16  Hence, it may 
well be that the Court did not realize that its statements regarding ―persons having 
ordinary skill in the art‖ have significant implications for patent cases involving 
obviousness and several other areas of the law.17  
This Article seeks to fill in the gaps left by the Court.  By way of background, 
there is a discussion of the origins and evolution of the United States patent system for 
insight into the tensions underlying current patent decisions. Similar attention is paid to 
the development of the concept of ―obviousness,‖ beginning with the Court‘s 
introduction of an ―invention‖ requirement , discussing Congress‘ adoption of 
―obviousness‖ in § 103 in 1952, and ending with a discussion of subsequent decisions 
regarding the scope and intent of this section. 
Having thus established the significance of ―ordinary skill‖ and ―person having 
ordinary skill in the art,‖ a construction is then made of these terms.  This includes 
looking to the various uses of ―ordinary skill‖ and ―person having ordinary skill‖ within 
Supreme Court precedent and the 1952 Patent Act, as well as dictionaries, to try to derive 
potential meanings for the terms and assess the propriety of the same.  The meanings so 
derived are then compared with the Court‘s statements in KSR to determine how (or if) 
they are consistent with precedent.  Finally, as KSR is the law of the land, several 
potential results of a widespread implementation of the Court‘s views are posited so that 
the decision‘s full impact can be appreciated. 
 
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 
 
The American patent system is a complex, multi-faceted endeavor which most 
people have no real desire to understand.  It has its own language and its participants are 
generally specialists.  Like tax law, securities regulation, and other technical areas of the 
law, it can seem incomprehensible and intimidating to outsiders.  Moreover, in giving 
―exclusive‖ rights for inventions, the patent system has struck and continues to strike 
many as encouraging frivolous applications and creating improper monopolies.  At the 
same time, though, the present patent system reflects an amazing evolution from historic 
                                                 
16 Id. at 1734 (citing Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
17 Note that on the actual subject on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the holding is 
facially relatively limited.  The Court recognized the value of the test as a means to avoid 
improper hindsight findings of obviousness, and the importance of an explicit rationale for 
finding a combination was proper.  Id. at 1740-41.  Indeed, it did not suggest that applying the 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation test would be improper in all, or even most, cases – simply 
that it was not appropriate as an absolute requirement every time combinations of art were the 
basis for obviousness contentions.  Id. at 1741-42.  Based on these aspects of the ruling, the 
Federal Circuit has already upheld a verdict based explicitly on the teaching, suggestion, and 
motivation test where the parties had agreed to jury instructions based on this test before the 
decision in KSR was announced.  See Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave., Inc., 511 F.3d 1157, 1172 
(Fed. Cir. 2008).  




practices of privilege and power to something approaching a truly open meritocracy, a 
fundamentally American concept.  From the administration of George Washington to the 
present day, these contrasting perceptions have created a tension and kept the law in a 
state of flux in the effort to strike just the right balance.  
 
 
A.  European Roots 
 
Having a patent, or an invention being patented, has almost a talismanic property 
in modern advertising and common thought.  It appears to consumers and investors as 
clear proof of superiority, the government‘s version of a Good Housekeeping Seal of 
Approval.  However, patents originated as nothing more than a tool in an expansive 
control and patronage system.  The term ―letters patent‖ refers to the concept of a royal 
grant where the seal is placed in such a way that the grant can be read openly (that is, 
patently), rather than only by cracking a seal.18  Along with granting titles, land, charters, 
and other monopolies, patents were simply one more way to express royal privilege.19  
This was often accompanied by a sizeable donation to the royal coffers.20 
It was only with the advent of the Renaissance in Europe that the scope of pa tents 
even began to embrace technical innovation.  It is acknowledged that the first grant to 
cover a purported invention was given by Florence in 1421 to Filippo Brunelleschi for a 
novel form of watercraft.21  The grant was explicitly couched in terms of overcoming the 
inventor‘s desire to keep the invention secret by giving him the right to exclude all other 
novel craft from Florentine waters for three years.22  This was notable both due to the 
lack of any requirement that these craft resemble the inventor‘s own or even any 
description of the invention as it would be used. 23  The invention, as it proved, was a 
notorious disaster, and Florence did not institutionalize the practice.24 
There may not have been much reason for Florence‘s leaders to see this 
experiment as worthy of widespread implementation.  Powerful families and rulers had 
long standing customs of commissioning military and technical works from engineers 
and inventors.  For example, Leonardo da Vinci routinely submitted military proposals to 
                                                 
18 Bruce W. Bugbee, The Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law 14 (1967); see also 
Staff of House of Rep. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary 96th Cong., The History of Private Patent Legislation in the House of 
Representatives 4 (1979). [hereinafter Private Patent Legislation].  
19 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 14-15. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 17-18. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 18. 
24 Id. at 19. 




various local rulers and obtained positions with both the Duke of Milan and Cesare 
Borgia.25  The Florentine grant to Brunelleschi simply changed the patronage equation 
from a grant of money or position to a grant of exclusivity.  This was something only a 
state could convey and was obviously less draining on the city coffers than a direct 
payment.  To borrow the language of another commercial empire, the difference was 
being paid on the front end versus the back end.  In either case, inventors were trying to 
ensure they were going to get paid before they turned over their secrets. 
The first effort at institutionalizing a system of granting monopolies for purported 
inventions was undertaken by Venice in 1474. 26  Like the grant to Brunelleschi, the 
statute claimed to be designed to encourage inventions to be used, rather than kept 
secret.27  However, it did not focus on encouraging what modern times would strictly 
consider innovation.  The only requirement was that the device in question had not been 
known in Venice itself, rather than any requirement of absolute novelty. 28  Hence, while 
this has been credited as the first ―patent statute,‖ the core value of ―novelty‖ commonly 
associated with the patent system would be a product of subsequent evolution and 
change. 
The next developments that laid the foundation for the modern American patent 
system took place in England.  There, patent grants had a long history, but without any 
particular focus on technology.  Rather, for hundreds of years they were granted to 
encourage industry, reward favorites, and replenish the royal coffers.29  At the end of the 
sixteenth century, Parliament began to assert its power under Elizabeth I and this system 
of royal prerogative became a source of conflict.30 
Still, it took another two decades for the conflict between Crown and Parliament 
to come fully to a head.  Elizabeth, with her normal aplomb for defusing situations, 
cancelled many of the most abusive patents and agreed to permit legal review of all 
remaining grants.31  James I, Elizabeth‘s successor, initially sought to restrain the use of 
the patent power in keeping with Elizabeth‘s concessions and the ruling in the Darcy 
case 32  that unduly broad or lengthy grants were improper monopolies. 33   As his 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Leonardo - Renaissance Man, http://www.mos.org/Leonardo/inventor.html (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2008) (describing Leonardo‘s inventions for the Duke of Milan and Cesare 
Borgia). 
26 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 22; Private Patent Legislation, supra note 17, at 4. 
27 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 22. 
28 Id. at 22-23. 
29 See Private Patent Legislation, supra note 17, at 4; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 36-37; Floyd 
L. Vaughan, The United States Patent System: Legal and Economic Conflicts in American Patent 
History 14 (1956).  
30 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 36-37; Vaughan, supra note 28, at 14. 
31 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 37; Vaughan, supra note 28, at 14. 
32 Darcy v. Allin, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B. 1602).  




relationship with Parliament became increasingly strained and the royal need for 
independent income grew, however, James reverted to the granting of patents for a broad 
range of industries and trades.34  
This perceived abuse finally led to Parliament‘s passage of the Statute of 
Monopolies.35  It is generally described as limiting patents to grants to ―the true and first 
inventor or inventors‖ of ―any manner of new manufacture within this realm.‖ 36  
Additionally, any such grants were to be for limited times – twenty-one years from grant 
for existing patents and fourteen years for new ones.37  However, there were less well-
known exceptions allowing existing and new grants in particular fields ranging from 
ordinance to printing. 38  The same act also allowed the crown to continue to grant 
charters and privileges to ―corporations‖ or ―companies‖ for any number of commercial 
endeavors.39  Hence, while ―patents‖ could no longer be granted on common items of 
manufacture, monopolies on such items and other concessions could be and were still 









                                                                                                                                                 
33 Id. at 1140; see Bugbee, supra note 17, at 37-38; Vaughan, supra note 28, at 15.  
34 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 38; Vaughan, supra note 28, at 15. 
35 Private Patent Legislation, supra note 17, at 4; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 38; Vaughan, 
supra note 28, at 15.  Notably, the sources alternatively date the act as being passed in 1623 or 
1624, but all agree on its text and the citation to it at 21 James 1, cl. 3. 
36 Vaughan, supra note 28, at 15; accord Bugbee, supra note 17, at 39 (describing the statute 
almost identically). 
37 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 39 (describing impact on existing and new grants); Vaughan, 
supra note 28, at 15 (describing the 14 year term for new grants).  The choice of terms that were 
multiples of seven has been ascribed to the requirement in various English patents that the 
recipient of the grant train one or more apprentices to learn how to make use of the subject of the 
grant.  Bugbee, supra note 28, at 34.  Notably, fourteen years was also chosen as the initial 
maximum term for patents granted by the United States.  U.S. Dep‘t of Commerce, Patent and 
Trademark Office, The Story of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 1 (1988) [hereinafter The 
Story of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office]. 
38 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 40. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 




B.  The Early American Experience 
 
The English scheme of patents and corporations was carried over by many of the 
American colonies and was retained during and after the American Revolution. 41  Like 
the English system, early American patents were generally granted according to 
individual appeals, rather than on a systemic, standardized basis.42  Owing to the local 
focus of these schemes, multiple persons could have claims to the same invention.  The 
most well known example of this phenomenon was the competing claims of John Fitch 
and James Ramsey to have invented the steamboat.43  In other cases, the same inventor 
sought multiple patents to ensure enforceable rights in various places.44  One of the best-
known inventors to do so was Oliver Evans, who sought numerous state patents for his 
invention of an automated mill system before obtaining the third patent granted by the 
United States for the same invention.45  
Despite this history, or perhaps because of it, creating Federal intellectual 
property rights was essentially an afterthought of what became the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787.  There was no provision for centralized grants under the Articles of 
Confederation, 46 nor was there discussion of such a power in the major proposals to 
revise the Articles submitted after the Convention began in May 1787. 47  It was only on 
August 18, 1787, after the major structure of the new Constitution had been agreed on, 
that two suggestions were made that some form of power to reward innovations should be 
vested in the Federal government. 48   One set of suggestions, by James Madison of 
Virginia, included ―encourag[ing] by premiums & provisions, the advancements of useful 
knowledge and discoveries.‖49  The other, from Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, 
explicitly stated that the legislature should have the power ―[t]o grant patents for useful 
                                                 
41 Private Patent Legislation, supra note 17, at 4; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 57; Vaughan, 
supra note 28, at 15-18; see also Silvio A. Bedini, Thomas Jefferson: Statesman of Science 177 
(1990) (noting Jefferson‘s thoughts on monopolies, or patents, in the United States).  
42 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 82-83; Vaughan, supra note 28, at 15-18. 
43 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 95-98; Vaughan, supra note 28, at 17.  Ironically, after fighting 
each other for years before the passage of the Constitution, both lost out to Robert Fulton in the 
race to create a viable vessel some 20 years later.  Bugbee, supra note 17, at 98. 
44 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 85-88, 99-101; Bedini, supra note 40, at 20; see also Vaughan, 
supra note 28, at 17 (describing patents on steam boat and mill technologies in multiple states).  
45 Bedini, supra note 40, at 209; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 99-101; Vaughan, supra note 28, at 
17. 
46 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 128; Vaughan, supra note 28, at 18. 
47 Bedini, supra note 40, at 178; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 126. 
48 Bedini, supra note 40, at 178; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 126. 
49 Bedini, supra note 40, at 178; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 126. 




inventions.‖50  Both suggestions contemplated granting authors control over their works 
for defined times.51  The motions carried unanimously and were referred to committee for 
final language. 52   The resulting language, commonly referred to as the ―patent and 
copyright‖ clause, actually fails to use either term.  Rather, it states that Congress has the 
power ―to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and 
discoveries.‖53  
The Founders‘ underlying intent for giving Congress the power ―to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts‖ by granting exclusive rights for limited periods is 
unclear.  There is no direct history of debate to attach to the addition of this clause 
beyond the suggestions by Pinckney and Madison.54  There was no impassioned defense 
for this proposal, but simply a short passage from Madison in Federalist No. 43 in which 
these were called out as some of the ―miscellaneous powers‖ of the legislature. 55  
Granting these powers to the legislature may be seen as having no goal beyond stripping 
traditional royal prerogatives and patronage from the executive branch.  There is nothing 
to suggest that the Founders generally envisioned the breadth or depth of the current 
system, with its focus on the balance between private benefit and public good and a 
systematic analysis of every application.   
Indeed, the first several applications for patents and copyrights were made 
directly to Congress, as they would have previously been directed to the Crown or the 
state legislatures.56  It was only after realizing that this system was unworkable that 
Congress passed the first Patent Act in 1790.57  This act, in turn, set the stage for a brief 
period that established several principles that are reflected in the current patent system.   
Despite the constitutional vesting of the power to grant exclusive rights in the 
legislative branch, the first Patent Act delegated the actual duty of reviewing and granting 
                                                 
50 Bedini, supra note 40, at 178; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 126. 
51 Bedini, supra note 40, at 178; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 126. 
52 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 126. 
53 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
54 Bugbee, supra note 17, at 126, 129. 
55 The Federalist No. 43 at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 2003). The only 
arguments to be found in favor of the clause in this document are that the powers themselves are 
well founded and a claim that ―States cannot separately make effectual provision for either‖ 
copyrights or granting inventors some form of rights.  Id.  Note that even here, Madison did not 
state whether the rights given inventors would be in the form of patents or some other 
consideration. 
56 See Private Patent Legislation, supra note 17, at 5; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 131-135. 
57 Private Patent Legislation, supra note 17, at 5; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 133-144. 




particular requests to the executive branch. 58   Specifically, the Attorney General, 
Secretary of War, and Secretary of State were designated as a committee to analyze and 
pass judgment on patent applications. 59   The ultimate responsibility for issuing any 
patents lay with the Secretary of State – who at the time was Thomas Jefferson.60 
 
 
C.  The Jeffersonian Experiment 
 
Jefferson seemed an unlikely candidate to create a robust patent system.  Jefferson 
had been on assignment as America‘s minister to France during the Constitutional 
Convention.61  From his correspondence with James Madison it is clear Jefferson would 
not have supported the passage of Article I § 8 clause 8 as written.62  While recognizing 
that a patent provision might be an ―incitement[] to ingenuity,‖ he nonetheless stated that 
―the benefit of even limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their 
general suppression.‖ 63  As late as 1789, he urged Madison to clarify the limits of 
Congress‘ power to grant monopolies in the proposal that led to enactment of the Bill of 
Rights.64  Under Jefferson‘s proposal, monopolies would be allowed ―to persons for their 
own productions in literature, and their own inventions in the arts, for a term not 
exceeding–years, but for no longer term and for no other purpose.‖65  Rather than a form 
of property like a patent, from these and later writings it appears Jefferson viewed the 
ideal intellectual property grant as more akin to a bonus or award of profits in recognition 
of the inventor‘s contribution to society.66 
Despite his personal dubiousness about the propriety of patents, 67  Jefferson 
refrained from killing the patent system even though he had been given a golden 
opportunity.  Rather than simply rejecting all applications on principle, Jefferson threw 
                                                 
58 Bedini, supra note 40, at 206; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 144. 
59 Bedini, supra note 40, at 206; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 144. 
60 Bedini, supra note 40, at 207. 
61 Id. at 129, 177. 




66 Id. at 177, 441-442.  It would seem, therefore, that Jefferson would have been 
philosophically opposed to the widespread practice of assigning patent rights from inventors to 
corporations, venture capitalists, and others. 
67 Id. at 207. 




himself into the task of devising a system of analysis in reviewing applications.68  He 
ensured that every application was examined by the members of the committee, 
conducted practical trials as necessary, and ultimately granted sixty-seven patents before 
his resignation on December 31, 1793.69  Jefferson also chose not to take a narrow view 
of the scope of the ―useful arts‖ for which patents could be granted, such as munitions 
and other items of direct governmental interest.  Instead, items of general societal value, 
such as Oliver Evans‘ automated mill, 70 Eli Whitney‘s cotton gin, 71 and an allegedly 
improved method for desalinating seawater, 72  represented the breadth of Jefferson‘s 
inquiries.  This set the stage for the wide range of materials that can be patented today.  
Jefferson‘s close scrutiny and skepticism of many applications also foretold of a 
major facet of the current patent system.  His experience highlights a tension that persists 
to this day.  Within months of undertaking his duties, Jefferson noted the huge impact the 
possibility of obtaining patents was having on the public.73  As he put it, ―‗[a]n Act of 
Congress authorizing the issuing of patents for new discoveries has given a spring of 
invention beyond my conception.‘‖74  Still, Jefferson set an exacting standard.  From the 
outset, he felt that minor alterations or new uses of existing technology should not be 
patented.75  He also spoke of the danger of ―frivolous‖ applications and patents during the 
very infancy of the system, a concern that is still expressed today.  76  Nonetheless, there is 
                                                 
68 Id. at 207-211; see Bugbee, supra note 17, at 150.   
69 Bedini, supra note 40, at 207-211.  
70 Id. at 209. 
71 Id. at 247-248.  
72 Id. at 210-11.  While the experiments did not demonstrate any improvement over the known 
technique of distillation, Jefferson considered them valuable since they brought the ability to 
render sea water potable to the notice of the public.   
73 Id. at 207. 
74 Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Vaughan (June 27, 1790), in 6 The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 578 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1943)); Bugbee, supra note 17, at 148 
(same).  
75 Bedini, supra note 40, at 208-209.  Specifically, Jefferson created rules that changing the 
application, material, and form by themselves would not give rise to patent rights.  
76 Id. at 209.  Despite stating while in office that ―any new combination of the mechanical 
powers already known‖ should be entitled to protection, later incidents suggest Jefferson would 
not have countenanced the widespread existence of combination and improvement patents in the 
modern era.  Id. at 209, 441-42.  For example, he resented to some degree paying royalties under 
Evans‘s second federal automated mill patent for works constructed by a workman on his 
property.  Id. at 442.  The objection stemmed from Jefferson‘s conclusion that the patent covered 
a combination of known elements, no matter the uniqueness of the resulting machine. Id.  Still, he 
ultimately paid the price asked rather than engage in litigation.  




no doubt that Jefferson helped to firmly establish patents as a key incentive to ingenuity 
in America at a critical time.  
 
 
D.  Pendulum Swings to the Present Day 
 
The tensions and contradictions Jefferson exhibited have persisted in the 
American system to the present day.  On the one hand, inventors who signed up for the 
benefits of the system almost immediately began complaining about its shortcomings.77  
Jefferson, out of office, found that the system under a revised Patent Act was too lax in 
its examination. 78  Over time, judicial rulings and public sentiment have caused the 
pendulum of patent law to swing periodically between skepticism and generosity.  This 
reactionary cycle seems unlikely to change in the absence of a tectonic shift in the 
intellectual property system worldwide. 
Inventors have never been satisfied with the system, likely owing to its limited 
nature.  One of the first inventors to take full use of the system was Oliver Evans, seeking 
protection for his automated mill and later improvements to the same. 79  He was also one 
of the first to be dissatisfied with the system, seeking by Congressional petition to extend 
the 14 year term of his early patent based on the claim it was too short to receive 
adequate remuneration for his invention.80  In the short term, this led to a period in which 
inventors repeatedly sought the very sort of individual Congressional attention that the 
Patent Act had sought to avoid.81  In the long term, this sense of the patent system as a 
necessary evil persists with most inventors and companies who invest significant capital 
in intellectual property. 
There has also been a near constant sense that patentees are seeking to abuse the 
system and that too often the system is complicit in granting undeserving applications.  
After the passage of the second Patent Act in 1794, the system began a lurching 
progression towards the independent patent office of modern practice.  However, the start 
seemed like a step backward to Jefferson.82  The system was effectively shifted from an 
examination system to one of registration, with an emphasis on bureaucratic compliance 
rather than novelty.83  Jefferson himself viewed the result with disappointment, fearing 
that the grant of patents had become too automatic, leaving only the courts as a potential 
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78 Bedini, supra note 40, at 210. 
79 Id. at 209. 
80 Private Patent Legislation, supra note 17, at 6-7. 
81 Id. at 7. 
82 Bedini, supra note 40, at 210. 
83 Id.; Private Patent Legislation, supra note 17, at 7; The Story of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, supra note 36, at 2-3; Bugbee, supra note 17, at 150.  




means to weed out frivolous patents.84  Congress would eventually come to agree, but not 
until 1836.85 
Again, this skepticism has been a constant feature of the patent system to this day, 
even though registration was supplanted by a renewed focus on examination under the 
1836 law.86  Many individuals, like Jefferson‘s first impulse, find the very concept of 
granting anything approaching a monopoly fundamentally troubling.  Many businesses, 
particularly those who do not wish to invest in research and development, would much 
rather do away with the system in its entirety.   
 Tracing the arc of the pendulum of patent protection between the pull of inventors 
and skeptics over the last two hundred years is beyond the scope of this Article.  
However, the dynamic nature of patent law can be illustrated by comparing the rulings of 
the Federal Circuit soon after its founding twenty-five years ago with the trends of today.  
It suggests that the pendulum, with perhaps a boost from Congress, swung heavily in 
favor of patentees, only to retreat and perhaps move to the opposite end of the arc today.  
The legislation authorizing the creation of a unified appellate court with 
jurisdiction over patent disputes was first introduced in 1979 as part of an omnibus 
Federal Court Improvement Act.87 Rather than create a specialized patent court to hear 
cases in the first instance, this new court merged the dockets of the pre-existing Circuit 
Court of Patent Appeals (which had jurisdiction over appeals from Patent and Trademark 
Office proceedings such as interferences and appeals of rejections) with the Court of 
Claims (which had jurisdiction over claims against the Federal Government under a 
number of statutory provisions) and vested it with appellate jurisdiction over patent 
cases.88  Despite passage by the Senate unanimously in 1979, and passage of a parallel 
bill in the House of Representatives in 1980, final passage was delayed until 1982.89   
As stated in the legislative history, the goal of this act was to bring stability and 
uniformity to the area of patent law.90  There was a general sense that the value of patents 
was being eroded by their treatment in the various circuit courts. 91  Intriguingly, the 
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87 S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 1-2 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11-12. 
88 Id. at 2-3, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12-13. 
89 Id. at 1-2, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 11-12. 
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incentive.‖ Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 




Senate Judiciary Committee Report noted that ―[t]he committee found particularly 
persuasive the testimony of the users of the patent system.‖ 92  While it may not have been 
overtly stated, it is apparent that these users – patent prosecutors, patentees, and the 
corporations obtaining patents at great cost – would not support a court which they 
thought would make patents more difficult to obtain or more likely to be invalidated. 
The early returns from the Federal Circuit suggested that the new court would 
meet the expectations of users.  One of the first significant cases the Federal Circuit dealt 
with was Underwater Devices.93  In that case, the only defense to a claim of willful 
infringement (that is, intentional, purposeful infringement supporting judicial 
enhancement of damages) was the opinion of the defendant‘s in-house counsel that the 
patent would probably be held invalid.94  That opinion was not based on any meaningful 
analysis, but rather on two conclusory (and incorrect) statements about the impact of an 
article on the patent and a comment that ―[c]ourts, in recent years, have-in patent 
infringement cases-found the patents claimed to be infringed upon invalid in 
approximately 80% of the cases.‖95  This ―advice‖ was found to be inadequate (although 
no one challenged the statistics) and led to the recognition of a ―duty‖ not to infringe 
patents and to seek opinions of qualified patent counsel.96   
In its first decade, the Federal Circuit railed against the rampant, baseless claims 
of inequitable conduct,97 making it clear that injunctive relief would be presumptively 
available upon the finding that a patent was valid and infringed. 98  The Federal Circuit 
also generally fulfilled the Congressional goal that patent law would become more 
uniform and consistent,99 hence leading to greater certainty as to the value of patents.  
Reaching back to nineteenth century precedent, the Federal Circuit also announced its 
                                                                                                                                                 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing Advisory Comm. on Indus. Innovation Final Rep., Dep't 
of Commerce (Sep. 1979)).  
92 S. Rep. No. 97-275 at 5, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15. 
93 Underwater Devices v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled 
on other grounds by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
94 Id. at 1385, 1389-90. 
95 Id. at 1385. 
96 Id. at 1389-90. 
97 See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (decrying ―absolute plague‖ of ―charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent 
case‖) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); 
see also id. at 876-77 (en banc finding that gross negligence would not suffice to establish the 
intent to deceive necessary to support inequitable conduct).  
98 See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (―It is the 
general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound 
reason for denying it.‖).  
99 S. Rep. No. 97-275 at 5-6, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15-16. 




intent to interpret patents to preserve their validity wherever possible.100  The Federal 
Circuit also adopted the precedent of the Court of Claims and Patent Appeals as 
binding.101  This included the holding that any effort to combine different pieces of prior 
art to invalidate a patent had to be accompanied by a showing of something, such as a 
suggestion, that would lead a person of ―ordinary skill‖ to make the combination in the 
absence of the teachings of the patent.102   
 Over the last several years, though, these strong statements have been weakened 
tremendously or simply condemned to the dustbin of history.  Claim construction, while 
considered exclusively a question of law,103 remains a vexing and uncertain process for 
patentees, attorneys, district court judges, and accused infringers.104  Inequitable conduct 
still plagues court proceedings and is arguably easier to find than ever.105  The Court has 
rejected the presumption of injunctive relief, requiring that ―ordinary principles of 
equity‖ be used instead.106  The promise that patents would be interpreted to preserve 
validity has all but disappeared, as claim construction has been divorced from validity 
                                                 
100 ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 & n.11 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(―claims should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity‖) (citing Klein v. Russell, 
86 U.S. (19 Wall) 433, 466 (1874); Turrill v. Michigan S. & N. Ind. R.R., 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 491, 
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101 See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
102 See In re McKenna, 203 F.2d 717, 721 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (noting the lack of any suggestion 
to combine in the prior art, one leg of the ―teaching, suggestion, or motivation‖ test later 
overruled by KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007)). 
103 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996) (Markman II). 
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Fractured State of Claim Construction and the Potential Use of Equity to Unify it, 15 Tex. Intel. 
Prop. L.J. 457 (2007). 
105 See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1363-66 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(affirming finding that writing prophetic example in past tense was inequitable conduct); see also 
Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1193-95 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming summary 
judgment of inequitable conduct based on failure to disclose connections of affiants as to meaning 
of term in patent application to company prosecuting application); cf. 437 F.3d at 1196-98 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (noting unchallenged accuracy of affidavits as to meaning of term, 
minimal nature of contacts, compliance of affidavits with terms of patent examiner request, and 
again noting that this appears to resurrect the ―plague‖ of baseless assertions of inequitable 
conduct in pre-Kingsdown litigation; 323 F.3d at 1374-75, 1381 (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting 
predictive, accurate nature of example and ―new plague‖ of inequitable conduct).  
106 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-94 (2006). 




challenges.107  At most, it is a principle that applies to resolve the meaning of ambiguous 
terms as a matter of last resort.108  The Federal Circuit, in its wisdom, has decided to 
repeal the concept of a duty of care to avoid infringement in its entirety. 109  And the 
Court‘s ruling in KSR made clear that the ―teaching, suggestion, or motivation‖ test is at 
most a benchmark of obviousness and not any sort of hard and fast requirement.110  In a 
very real sense, one could question if the existence of the Federal Circuit has, in fact, 
substantially improved the certainty and uniformity of patent law and thus enhanced the 
value of patents.  
 
 
III. THE PATH FROM THE COMMON LAW REQUIREMENT OF ―INVENTION‖ TO THE 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF ―NONOBVIOUSNESS‖ 
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that a pendulum is an apt analogy for the 
perpetual flux of patent law, and the current swing seems to be towards a more skeptical  
view of patent protection.  Now, the agent of the next change may be something that no 
one seriously contemplated or analyzed leading up to that moment.  For example, the 
statements in KSR regarding the scope of the talents and knowledge of a person of 
ordinary skill in the art may simply be viewed as colorful dicta applicable at most to 
combination patents.  They may be viewed as a narrow, natural clarification.  Or they 
may result in a wholesale overhaul of how patents are written, interpreted, and enforced, 
and essentially signal the exclusion of entire categories of science from patent protection.  
A further analysis of the origins and evolution of the doctrine of obviousness, the likely 
meaning of the terms ―ordinary skill‖ and ―person having ordinary skill‖ and the impact 
of KSR on those meanings follows.   
 
 
A. Obviousness Enters the American Patent System as “Invention” 
 
    Jefferson‘s misgivings that the grant of patents had become ―too automatic‖ did 
not lead to a systemic change for the first 40 years of the American patent system.  
Despite the fact that the 1793 Patent Act authorized courts to test and adjudge the validity 
of patents, there was no appreciable effort in this regard.  Even after the restoration of 
examination procedures in 1836, examination was limited to pure questions of novelty 
                                                 
107 See Saunders Group, Inc. v. Comfortrac, Inc., 492 F.3d 1326, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 
Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Liebel-Flarsheim I) and 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 
108 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1326-27 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim I, 358 F.3d at 908). 
109 See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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and utility.111  There is no indication, moreover, that Jefferson‘s careful rules regarding 
applications of old materials to new applications were being heeded. 
 The subject matter at issue in Hotchkiss indicates that, under the revived 
examination system, patents were being granted for applications that Jefferson would 
have deemed ―frivolous.‖  The patent at issue in Hotchkiss was granted in 1841, a full 
five years after the restoration of examination. 112  On its face, the patent asserted that an 
―improvement in making door and other knobs, of all kinds of clay used in pottery, and of 
porcelain‖ had been invented.113  However, upon a subsequent trial it became apparent 
that the ―improvement‖ consisted of adapting potter‘s clay – a well known substance 
which could and had been shaped into knobs – to replace wood or metal in knobs of a 
particular, known design.114  Based on that evidence, the trial court instructed the jury 
that if the asserted invention amounted to a substitution of one known material for 
another, with ―no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than 
that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was 
invalid‖ and the jury should find for the defendants.115  The plaintiffs appealed from the 
resulting verdict claiming error in the jury instruction. 116  
 Before the Court, both sides turned to English precedent and hornbooks more than 
direct American precedent.  The plaintiffs put great weight on cases suggesting that 
manufacturing items from one material over another could create a patentable 
distinction.117  While acknowledging that the principle of obviousness had been used to 
bar certain improvement patents in English practice, the plaintiffs sought to minimize the 
doctrine.118  The defendants‘ arguments noted the problem of not requiring some greater 
level of invention, such as never ending patents for each known material applied to a 
known product.119  Notably, however, neither side cited the writings of Jefferson on the 
unavailability of patents for new uses of old materials. 
 In weighing these arguments, the Court ultimately sided with the defendants. 120  
The majority noted that this was not a situation where a new material had been created, or 
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even where it had been adapted for the first time to a particular use. 121  The Court 
suggested that if the patentees could have shown any part of the claimed combination was 
novel, down to making a knob from potter‘s clay, a patent may have been available for 
the resulting ―new composition of matter.‖122  Lacking any such evidence, the Court 
found that any reduction in costs or other manufacturing advantages were insufficient, as 
it at most showed ―judgment and skill‖ in selecting materials, not invention. 123  As a 
result, there was no error in the instructions,  
 
for unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening 
the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or 
porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted 
with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and 
ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other 
words, the improvement is the work of the skilful [sic] mechanic, not that 
of the inventor.124 
 
Like the parties, the Court was apparently unaware of Jefferson‘s simple rule on 
the use of old materials, or chose to ignore it.  While the ultimate conclusion on this 
particular case was the same as Jefferson‘s view, it might have saved countless time and 
effort if the Court had simply applied such a rule, confined to the narrow issue of 
adapting known materials to new uses.  Instead, the Hotchkiss Court ushered in what 
would ultimately become known as obviousness onto the American legal scene, and set 
the stage for a century of frustration and inconsistency as courts grappled with the 
problem of separating mere mechanics from inventors.  
 
 
B. Requiring “Invention” Leads to Uncertainty, Frustration, and Flashes of Insight  
 
As Hotchkiss suggested, determining whether a patent reflected merely 
mechanical skill or true invention is a fact-intensive analysis.125  This, in turn, led to  a 
period of uncertainty over both how to conduct this analysis and whether it was even 
appropriate to review patents on this basis, as it was a challenge to the findings of the 
Commissioner of Patents in awarding the grant in the first instance. 126  Having decided 
that reviewing the inventive nature of patents was within the purview of courts, cases 
diverged on how to assess invention.  Some nineteenth century case law essentially 
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rejected an all inclusive examination in favor of a bright line threshold for invention 
divorced from consideration of the marketplace impact of the purported invention, 
particularly in the case of combinations of known elements. 127  Other cases, while 
recognizing the difficulties of the process envisioned by Hotchkiss, nonetheless embraced 
that complexity and suggested a fair degree of generosity in finding invention where 
market success was shown.128   
Over twenty years after Hotchkiss, a facial challenge was made to the entire 
process of court review for inventiveness. 129   In Reckendorfer, the holder of an 
improvement patent on combining an eraser tip with a lead pencil challenged the ability 
of the Court, in this regard, by arguing that the Commissioner of Patent‘s ruling was 
determinative. 130   The Court reviewed a series of cases, including Hotchkiss and its 
progeny, and concluded that it was apparent the Court had the same right to review 
conclusions as to usefulness and invention as it did over novelty.131 
Having confirmed its jurisdiction, the court announced a litmus test that would 
have to be met for any object that combined old structures.  The classic design of a lead 
pencil tipped with a small amount of eraser is well-known to anyone acquainted with 
standardized testing.  The convenience of having a portable, compact device that meets 
the needs of two tools and ensures that both of these key tools are at hand together was 
                                                 
127 See, e.g., id. at 355-57 (holding that the combination of a piece of rubber applied to one end 
of a lead pencil is not patentable, as a combination must produce a different result by its union, 
notwithstanding any market success demonstrated by the erasure-tipped pencil).  
128 See, e.g., Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495-96 (1876) (―We do not 
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convincing evidence to invalidate a patent, and the heightened deference afforded when the only 
art forming the basis of a challenge has already been considered and rejected by a patent 
examiner.  See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 
1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
131 Reckendorfer, 92 U.S. at 353-55. 




insufficient, in the Court‘s estimation, to constitute an invention.  132  Rather, the majority 
saw it as merely an ―an aggregation of separate elements,‖ with no ―new result produced 
by their union.‖133  The opinion argued that allowing patentability of this device would 
also require grants any time two somewhat related items, such as a hoe and a rake, or a 
pen and a pencil, were located at opposite ends of a common axis.134 Rather than analyze 
whether the value of this particular combination perhaps merited protection owing to its 
acceptance and market impact, the majority held that such devices could never be 
patented, as ―[p]erfection of workmanship, however much it may increase the 
convenience, extend the use, or diminish expense, is not patentable.‖135  Rather, ―[t]he 
combination, to be patentable, must produce a different force or effect, or result in the 
combined forces or processes, from that given by their separate parts.‖136 
Not every contemporary case seemed to endorse such bright lines, though.  In 
Goodyear Dental,137 the Court again confronted the question of whether a combination of 
known elements – the use of vulcanized rubber138 as a molded base for artificial teeth – 
was sufficiently inventive to support a patent.  In that case, the Court reached the 
opposite holding of Reckendorfer, finding that there was in fact an invention present. 139  
It also explicitly limited Hotchkiss to a rule ―that employing one known material in place 
of another is not invention, if the result be only greater cheapness and durability of the 
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product.‖ 140   By comparison, the Court here found a new composition, to use the 
language of Reckendorfer, in the combination of the plate and teeth.141 
The analysis of Goodyear Dental was multi-faceted.  The conclusion of 
patentability was partially driven by the view that vulcanized rubber created superior 
molding and fitting than prior base materials.142  At least as significant to the Court‘s 
holding, however, were considerations that Graham chose to label (or mislabel) 
―secondary‖:143 long felt need, commercial success, and industry acceptance. 144  As the 
Court put it:  
 
We do not say the single fact that a device has gone into general use, and 
has displaced other devices which had previously been employed for 
analogous uses, establishes in all cases that the later device involves a 
patentable invention. It may, however, always be considered; and, when 
the other facts in the case leave the question in doubt, it is sufficient to 
turn the scale.145   
 
The Supreme Court embraced a similarly broad approach in the Krementz 
decision.146  The patent at issue referred to making buttons from a single piece of metal, 
alleged to be an improvement over soldered two piece buttons. 147  Initially, the Court 
noted the difficulties of their task: 
 
It is not easy to draw the line that separates the ordinary skill of a 
mechanic, versed in his art, from the exercise of patentable invention, and 
the difficulty is specially great in the mechanic arts, where the successive 
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steps in improvements are numerous, and where the changes and 
modifications are introduced by practical mechanics.148 
  
The Court then analyzed the patented device both for direct and indirect evidence of 
invention.  As to the former, it found there was a measure of advantage in eliminating the 
need for soldering and thus the resulting weak spots in the prior art, thus meeting the only 
‗test‘ suggested by Reckendorfer.149  Instead of stopping there, though, the Court went on 
to analyze the failure of others in the field (including the accused infringer) to achieve the 
use of a single piece design before the patent‘s grant and the commercial success of the 
new buttons.150  As in Goodyear Dental, these latter indicia were the focus of much of the 
analysis and suggested that these types of evidence were critical to a full understanding of 
whether a patent reflected an ―invention.‖151  Thus, from some of the earliest cases, there 
were divergent tests and standards for ―inventiveness‖ that in some form or another have 
plagued this aspect of the law to the current day.  
The subsequent decades did reflect one sort of progress, as the ―invention‖ 
analysis began to be placed in a common context.  The Supreme Court eventually settled 
on analyzing the question in terms of what would be ―obvious‖ to a person of ―ordinary 
skill.‖152  The ―ordinary skill‖ standard should have brought some clari ty, as courts used 
it both in other patent issues and in non-patent cases.153  Similarly, patent applications 
began to be rejected as obvious,154 despite the lack of clear statutory authority to cite this 
as an official basis for rejection.155   
In terms of substance, though, the case law continued to be muddled and highly 
subjective.  The Court actually embraced this subjectivity, stating that it was essentially 
impossible to define the term ―invention‖ in a way that would help create a standard for 
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152 Mosler Safe & Lock Co. v. Mosler, Bahmann & Co., 127 U.S. 354, 360 (1888). 
153 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 176 (1852) (using ―ordinary skill‖ as 
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155 See Gustavus A. Weber, The Patent Office: Its History, Activities and Organization 35-38 
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analysis.156  Rather than any sort of clarity, time added layer upon layer of ―tests‖ and 
indicators of inventiveness, each with exceptions and counter-rules.157  To contemporary 
practitioners, such as Judge Rich, it appeared that judges and other decision makers were 
essentially determining the outcome then choosing from the menu of available tests and 
indicators to justify the result.158  
This seemingly untenable situation began to reach critical mass in 1941.  In that 
year, the Court declared the patent for a soon to be ubiquitous device – the automatic 
pop-up cigarette lighter for automobiles – invalid for want of invention.159  In some ways, 
the invention was like those discussed at length in Reckendorfer – a combination of two 
known systems (a wireless lighter and a thermostatic control) where both work together 
to create a new result (a lighter which indicates automatically when it is ready). 160  
Despite acknowledging the novelty of the result, however, the Court still rejected the 
patent for failing to demonstrate more than ―skill.‖ 161   Whether out of spite, 162 
inadvertence,163 or reasons known only to itself, the Court instead announced that to be 
patentable, ―the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative 
genius not merely the skill of the calling.‖164 
                                                 
156 See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891); see also Giles Rich, Why & How 
Section 103 Came to Be, 14 Fed. Cir. B.J. 181, 187 (2004) (paper originally prepared for delivery 
at Bureau of National Affair conference commemorating the 25th anniversary of 35 U.S.C. § 103 
(September 1977) and published in Nonobviousness--the Ultimate Condition of Patentability, 
1:201-1:213 (John F. Witherspoon ed., The Bureau of Nat‘l Affairs, Inc. 1980)) (quoting McClain 
as part of his critique of the ―invention‖ test). 
157 Rich, supra note 155, at 187-88. 
158 Id. at 187. 
159 Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Dev. Corp., 314 U.S 84, 89-91 (1941). 
160 Id. at 89-90; cf. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 357 (1875) (describing such items as 
combination of india rubber and sulfur to make vulcanized rubber, combination of advancing 
frame and saw producing joint action in saw mill, and ―stemwinding watch-key‖ as 
demonstrating joint action and hence inventiveness).  
161 Cuno, 314 U.S. at 90-91. 
162 See Rich, supra note 155, at 186 (suggesting that the unreasonable position of the 
patentee‘s attorney that there were no requirements beyond utility and novelty – again, shades of 
Reckendorfer – led to the controversial ―flash of genius‖ comment).  
163 See Graham v. John Deere of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 15 & n.7 (1966) (asserting that use of 
the phrase ―flash of genius,‖ rather than demonstrating a new, more restrictive standard,  ―was but 
a rhetorical embellishment of language going back to 1833‖).  
164 Cuno, 314 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added).  




This holding led to an increase of articles suggesting the Cuno case was beyond 
the pale.165  Coupled with an underlying sense of antagonism towards patents based in 
part on the wave of cases finding a lack of ―invention,‖ this decision is credited as 
beginning a groundswell towards patent reform.166  Furthering this movement was the 
1948 report of the National Patent Planning Commission (coincidentally created by the 
Roosevelt administration in 1941), which criticized a number of areas of patent law, but 
was particularly hard on the confusing and seemingly endlessly shifting requirement of 
―invention.‖167  This prompted Congress to begin to take actions that ultimately resulted 
in the 1952 Patent Act, and specifically the creation of a formal enshrinement of ―non-
obviousness,‖ rather than ―invention,‖ as a requirement of patentability. 168  Before any 
legislation was passed, though, the ridiculous nature of the ―invention test‖ was enough 
to drive no less a legal authority than Learned Hand to despair.  His contention was 
aimed at being unable to meaningfully determine the line between skill and invention, 
stating ―[t]hat issue is as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exits in 
the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts.‖169  Thus, the stage was set for an attempt at 




C. The Codification of Obviousness Rejects Flashes and Embraces the “Person of 
Ordinary Skill” – but “Invention” Lingers  
 
According to Judge Rich, the lion‘s share of credit for crafting the original § 103, 
now § 103(a), belongs to P.J. Federico, the former Chief Patent Examiner at the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (―PTO‖) (although Judge Rich was willing to give 
himself the second most important role in the process).170  This new law fulfilled at least 
three distinct purposes: 1) it avoided any confusion lingering about ‗flashes of genius‘ by 
                                                 
165 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 n.7; Rich, supra note 155, at 186 (―As usual, the patent bar 
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166 Rich, supra note 155, at 186.  For an illustration of the sense of pessimism about patent 
law, see also Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (noting that while patents had surely been granted improperly, ―I doubt that the 
remedy for such Patent Office passion for granting patents is an equally strong passion in this 
Court for striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not 
been able to get its hands on‖). 
167 Rich, supra note 155, at 186-87. 
168 See id. at 188-90. 
169 Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (1950); Rich, supra note 155, at 186 
(quoting Harries). 
170 Rich, supra note 155, at 181. 




stating that ―[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention 
was made‖; 2) it dropped any reference to invention, framing the question solely in terms 
of ―obviousness‖; and 3) most significantly to this Article, it enshrined in statute the use 
of ―a person having ordinary skill in the art‖ as the proper frame of reference for 
analyzing obviousness.171 
Despite the goals of the authors, the passage of § 103 did not eliminate the use of 
the term ―invention‖ in patent cases.172  Rather, until Graham, debate raged as to whether 
§ 103 simply reflected the same ―invention‖ standard,173 a substantially similar standard 
to that of ―invention‖ but without the subjectivity of the prior law (Judge Rich‘s own 
stated goal), 174  or something less than the old Hotchkiss standard. 175   In part, this 
confusion can be attributed to the official Committee Notes, which explicitly stated that 
―it is immaterial whether it [the invention] resulted from long toil and experimentation or 
from a flash of genius‖ and put to rest the uproar over Cuno, but lacked clarity on the 
goal of the rest of the provision.176  The drafters opened themselves up to the charge that 
no change was intended by alluding to the long history of holding patents invalid for lack 
of invention and stating that ―[t]his paragraph is added with the view that an explicit 
statement in the statute may have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a basis for 
the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be worked out, . . . .‖177  This was 
probably exacerbated by Judge Rich‘s public remarks in which the test was still referred 
to as one of ―invention.‖178 
During the next fourteen years, the circuit courts split over what the statute meant.  
The Third Circuit, acknowledging the concerns Judge Hand had in prior cases, took the 
passage of § 103 as an opportunity to reflect and seek to minimize any subjectivity or 
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172 Rich, supra note 155, at 188-91. 
173 See Wasserman v. Burgess & Blacher Co., 217 F.2d 402, 403-04 (1st Cir. 1954) (labeling § 
103 a ―codification‖ and explicitly invoking prior ―invention‖ case law); see also Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F.2d 912, 914-15 (6th Cir. 1953) (flatly rejecting any concept of 
change or modification to prior law).  
174 Rich, supra note 155, at 188-90; see also R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden’s, Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 
499-500 (3d Cir. 1956) (labeling § 103 a codification, but at the same time recognizing an attempt 
at stabilizing the law and trying to minimize prior subjectivity and prejudice against patents).  
175 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 16 (1966) (―It is contended, 
however, by some of the parties and by several of the amici that the first sentence of § 103 was 
intended to sweep away judicial precedents and to lower the level of patentability.‖).  
176 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (2000) (1952 Revision Notes).  
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178 Rich, supra note 155, at 191. 




anti-patent sentiment in their judgments.179  For his own part, Judge Hand considered the 
section a restoration of the Hotchkiss principle, which he noted had never been abjured 
but had essentially received only lip service from judges who would then invalidate 
patents on any conceivable basis.180  The First Circuit, reflecting what it saw as the 
general authority, persisted in using the very same ―invention‖ standard and refused to 
use the statutory term of ―obviousness.‖181  The Sixth Circuit, while not quite as explicit, 
showed its skepticism of the value of the provision by insisting it altered nothing and 
referring to it as ―so-called ‗obviousness. ‘‖182  Perhaps with a slightly hyperbolic note, 
Judge Rich described the early years of the provision thusly:  
 
This child of unknown parentage but many ancestors, was rejected, in its 
early days, by court after court with a passion akin to old-fashioned 
abhorrence of illegitimacy, especially of infants not of their own creation, 
and, with rather poor prospects of survival, was taken in and nourished by 
a kindly CCPA.183 
 
As late as 1966, the true effect of § 103 was still unclear.  Finally, the Supreme Court was 
forced to undertake a comprehensive review.184  Whereas Graham is generally cited 
today for its framework for assessing obviousness, 185 the scope of the Court‘s analysis 
was truly sweeping.  The Court chose to begin with the Congressional grant of patent 
power in the Constitution.186  It noted the intent of the section was to avoid granting 
undue monopolies as had occurred in English practice. 187  As the Court found, this 
concern resulted in the limits that Congress could grant patents only in reward of 
―[i]nnovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge‖ that 
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obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.‖). 
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did not ―remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to 
materials already available.‖188  
The Court also reviewed the history of patent developments in the United States 
at some length.  It presented both the official statements o f Jefferson and his later 
thoughts on the patent system, including his rules for assessing what inventions merited 
protection.189  It then turned its attention to Hotchkiss.190  The Court found that in essence 
Hotchkiss created a functional approach of comparing the subject matter that was 
patented (or sought to be patented in the case of applications) with the background skill 
in the art to determine if the subject matter is worthy of patent protection – that is, 
whether it was inventive in the Constitutionally authorized sense.191  
Having thus set the framework for examining the (relatively) new law, the Court 
made a detailed analysis of § 103.  Examining the structure and entire legislative history 
of the statutory provision, the court stated:   
 
that the revision was not intended by Congress to change the general level 
of patentable invention. We conclude that the section was intended merely 
as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition, 
with congressional directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the 
subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability. 192 
 
Despite this holding that § 103 did not change the general standard for patentability, 
Graham sought to close the door on the varied and confusing ―invention‖ formulations.  
The Court found that ―the § 103 additional condition, when followed realistically, will 
permit a more practical test of patentability. The emphasis on non-obviousness is one of 
inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures.‖193  In other 
words, the PTO and courts were still tasked with determining if a patent (or application) 
reflected inventive effort, but with a less cumbersome and subjective analytical 
framework.  Thus, as Judge Rich put it, ―[a]t the tender age of 14 [nonobviousness] was 
adopted by a kindly Supreme Court.‖194 
 Despite this seemingly clear statement, doubt still seemed to exist as to the shift 
away from ―invention‖ as the framework of legal analysis.  As Rich noted in 1977, 
casebooks still spoke in terms of this discarded standard, with all of its conflicted 
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statements, rather than the statutory term of nonobviousness. 195  As noted, the Court‘s 
post-Graham cases could be seen as trying to turn back to earlier ―invention‖ standards as 
well, albeit using the term ―synergy‖ for the test.196  Judge Rich, for his part, had a fairly 
wry take on this development.  Continuing his analogy of § 103 as a parentless child, he 
described these cases thusly: 
 
A few years later, upon discovering that it was a bastard, the Court 
decided it would at least have to change the name of the child, if it was to 
stay in the family, from unobviousness to synergism, thus covering up its 
natural origins with a pretense of legitimacy. (I wonder if there is a 
Freudian connection between sin and synergism.)  But this nonsense has 
afflicted the child with schizophrenia.197  
 
Given Judge Rich‘s view of synergy‘s value (or lack thereof) it should not be a surprise 
that he and the other early members of the Federal Circuit chose not to embrace the 
―synergy‖ line of cases.  Rather, the focus was on two guiding principles.  The bedrock 
was Graham, albeit with greater value given to ―secondary considerations‖ of non-
obviousness.198  The framework erected on Graham, though, was the CCPA precedent of 
requiring some teaching, suggestion, motivation, or other basis to combine references so 
as to further ensure a systematic, non-hindsight driven analysis of obviousness.199 
The impact of KSR‘s rejection of this second part of the Federal Circuit‘s 
fundamental jurisprudence, at least as an absolute requirement, has yet to be truly 
assessed.  On the one hand, when coupled with the suggestion that any analysis of a 
combination should be made explicit and cannot be hindsight driven, KSR may ultimately 
have little effect.200  It may be nothing more than a simple clarification that this fact-
                                                 
195 Id. at 181, 192. 
196 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007); Anderson's-Black Rock, 
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-62 (1969); Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite 
Co., 93 U.S. 486, 494 (1876).   
197 Rich, supra note 155, at 183. 
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intensive field sometimes requires a more flexible approach to avoid what are seen as 
improper results.201  On the other hand, coupled with a resurrection of synergy and the 
overall tenor of recent Court cases202 and the tenor of certain Court comments about the 
nature of the patent bar and patent office, 203 patent practitioners can be forgiven for 
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203 The following exchanges from two recent cases are enlightening.  First, on the subject of 
the patent bar, consider this exchange from KSR: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: It is -- I agree with the Chief Justice. It is misleading to say that the whole 
world is embraced within these three nouns, teaching, suggestion, or motivation, and then you 
define teaching, suggestion, or motivation to mean anything that renders it nonobvious. This is 
gobbledygook. It really is, it's irrational. 
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Justice Scalia, I this [sic] it would be surprising for this experienced Court 
and all of the patent bar -- remember, every single major patent bar association in the country has 
filed on our side -- 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, which way does that cut? That just indicates that this is 
profitable for the patent bar. 
(Laughter.) 
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Mr. Chief Justice, it turns out that actually is not accurate. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: It produces more patents, which is what the patent bar gets paid for, to 
acquire patents, not to get patent applications denied but to get them granted. And the more you 
narrow the obviousness standard to these three imponderable nouns, the more likely it is that the 
patent will be granted.  
Transcript of Oral Argument, at 41-42, KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) 
(No. 04-1350) (―KSR Trans.‖), 2006 WL 3422210.  
As to the nature and competency of the Patent and Trademark Office, consider the following 
from Quanta Computer, Inc. in debating an issue related to the exhaustion doctrine: 
MR. PHILLIPS: Well, I think that clearly understates the role of the PTO in granting a 
separate patent. I mean, this is not -- these are not things you pick up at the corner drugstore. You 
have to justify them. And if you look at Section 282, ―a patent shall be presumed valid,‖ each 
claim shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims. And there's an 
independence that's embedded in this entire scheme. If it's true that the PTO has in fact granted 
patent rights on something that's fundamentally not different from the other -- from some other 
patent, the solution to that is a validity challenge. And candidly, I think that's exactly what all of 
those arguments are -- 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, then -- 




thinking KSR may have a substantial, negative impact on patent practice.  Specifically, 
one must wonder how the current state of affairs serves to foster the legal stability and 
patent value sought with the passage of § 103 and the creation of the Federal Circuit.204   
 
 
IV. WHAT DOES ―PERSON HAVING ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART‖ MEAN? 
 
As noted above, the concept of a person or mechanic of ―ordinary skill‖ had a 
long history as a legal standard before the adoption of § 103.205  The use of the particular 
phrase ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ in the section was, according to Judge 
Rich, largely the idea of Federico, and had no single source. 206  Despite this lengthy 
history and its centrality to § 103, there is a sparse record of attempts at defining either 
―ordinary skill‖ or the phrase ―person having ordinary skill‖ in any context.  There 
appears to be no direct Supreme Court precedent on the issue of just what constitutes a 
―person having ordinary skill.‖  For example, no precedent was cited in support of KSR‘s 
conclusion that such persons are necessarily endowed with creativity, originality in 
problem solving, and the ability to combine the prior art like jigsaw puzzles.207  
This section will attempt to fill that gap in legal scholarship.  First, there is a 
review of the limited discussion in the case law about this aspect of a § 103 analysis, 
although most do not actually address the meaning of ―ordinary skill‖ or ―person having 
ordinary skill.‖  Next, standard rules of statutory interpretation are applied to try and 
discern what ―person having ordinary skill‖ is meant to convey at its root.  Finally, the 
definition arising from this analysis is compared with the Court‘s statements in KSR to 





                                                                                                                                                 
MR. PHILLIPS: -- is patent validity challenges. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That argument didn't prevail last year in the KSR case, right? I 
mean, we're  -- we've had experience with the Patent Office where it tends to grant patents a lot 
more liberally than we would enforce under the patent law.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-49, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 
2109 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2008 WL 143658. 
204 See supra Parts II.D, III.C. 
205 See supra notes 156-58.  
206 See Rich, supra note 155, at 190 (quoting P.J. Federico, The Origins of Section 103, 5 
APLA Q.J. 87 (1977)). 
207 See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740-42 (2007). 




A. Legal Constructions of the “Person Having Ordinary Skill” and “Ordinary” – a 
Hodgepodge of Minimal Explanation 
 
Patent law is replete with attempts at construing terms and phrases.  In the context 
of claim construction, there is no term too mundane to avoid intense analysis.  Such terms 
as ―about,‖208 ―permanently,‖209 ―baffles‖210 and ―inventory‖211 have been at the heart of 
disputes.  And yet, there has been no systematic attempt to construe the phrase ―person of 
ordinary skill‖ as used in § 103.  The Supreme Court has provided little meaningful 
interpretation, beyond a direction to assess ―ordinary skill.‖ 212   Courts of appeals, 
including the Federal Circuit, have similarly failed to interpret these terms in a systematic 
way.  Instead, there are a handful of accepted axioms and metaphors, almost all of which 
fail to explain what ―ordinary skill‖ truly is or who possesses it. 
Graham, for all of its vital importance as an interpretation of § 103, teaches 
almost nothing about the legal meaning of the component parts of the statute.  Rather, the 
vast majority of the case is concerned with placing the section in the evolution of the 
patent system. 213  As to the component parts of the statute itself, the decision simply 
provides a roadmap for an obviousness analysis, rather than any interpretation of the 
terms involved.214  Hence, the only statement relating to a ―person having ordinary skill 
in the art‖ is that ―the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art [must be] resolved.‖ 215  
While instructive on the need to make an assessment, it lends no insight as to what 
―ordinary skill‖ really is, much less what constitutes a ―person having ordinary skill in 
the art.‖   
The one other insight stated in passing by Graham was the substitution of 
―reasonably skilled‖ for the phrase ―ordinary skill‖ in the last sentence of the substantive 
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discussion.216  This language, which may have simply been a rhetorical choice to avoid 
the inelegance of incorporating the phrase ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ into 
the passage, is used repeatedly in the Dann217 case, which is one of only three Supreme 
Court cases to address obviousness between Graham and KSR.  Again, the Court 
provides no discussion of what would amount to a ―reasonable‖ quantum of skill.  Rather, 
the term is used primarily to underscore the point that the ―reasonably skilled‖ artisan, 
rather than a lay person, is the relevant audience for assessing obviousness.218  Hence, 
Graham and Dann arguably confuse the issue by substituting the general term 
―reasonably‖ for the term ―ordinary,‖ which at least had historical roots in patent law.  
On one other point, Dann is clear – the ―person‖ referred to is both hypothetical 
and charged with knowledge of the relevant art. 219  In this, it echoes the sentiments of 
Judge Hand as to the only meaningful way to apply § 103:  
 
The test laid down [in § 103] is indeed misty enough. It directs us to 
surmise what was the range of ingenuity of a person ―having ordinary 
skill‖ in an ―art‖ with which we are totally unfamiliar; and we do not see 
how such a standard can be applied at all except by recourse to the earlier 
work in the art, and to the general history of the means available at the 
time. To judge on our own that this or that new assemblage of old factors 
was, or was not, ―obvious‖ is to substitute our ignorance for the 
acquaintance with the subject of those who were familiar with it. 220 
 
The hypothetical nature of this person and their inquiry had also been emphasized in one 
of the best known metaphors in patent law.  Judge Rich, the co-author of § 103, stated 
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―if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that 
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious . . . ‖ rather than in the phrase ―person 
having ordinary skill in the art.‖ 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  After all, the comparison of subject 
matter and prior art cannot be from the perspective of a ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ 
unless the entire relevant art was available for that hypothetical person to analyze.  
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just months after Graham in Winslow221 that ―[w]e think the proper way to apply the 103 
obviousness test to a case like this is to first picture the inventor as working in his shop 
with the prior art references – which he is presumed to know – hanging on the walls 
around him.‖222  Judge Rich later clarified that the walls in his metaphor were meant only 
to contain the relevant art, rather than non-analogous art. 223  While it still does not 
directly address what constitutes ―ordinary skill,‖ this has become the pervasive approach 
for analyzing obviousness.224 
 Indirectly, Winslow also led to one of the very few significant attempts at 
explaining what is meant by the term ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ as a whole.  
Yet again, the author of this attempt was Judge Rich, this time as a member of the 
nascent Federal Circuit.  In Standard Oil,225 he sought to both minimize the future use of 
the Winslow metaphor and explain the true nature of ―ordinary skill.‖  In the case below, 
the trial court found a patent invalid after referencing the Winslow metaphor (although 
crediting only a District of Delaware case), but then found the patent invalid based on an 
analysis of the qualifications and purported knowledge of the actual inventor, rather than 
a hypothetical person. 226  Judge Rich pointed out that the metaphor was really the 
creation of the CCPA (albeit without mentioning his own role).227  He noted that ―[i]t has 
attained an unfortunate popularity with the judiciary,‖ seeking to clarify that it was the 
creation of a particular set of circumstances and that other courts should have paid 
attention to the intervening changes in the views of the Federal Circuit and CCPA. 228 
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 Having made his view of the enduring nature of Winslow clear, Judge Rich 
proceeded to point out that the court below erred in straying from the use of a 
hypothetical person of ―ordinary skill.‖229  Consistent with Dann, he pointed out the 
convention that this hypothetical person, and only such a person, was charged with the 
knowledge of the art.230  He then proceeded to note the critical distinction between a 
person of ordinary skill under § 103 and that of an inventor:   
 
The statutory emphasis is on a person of ordinary skill. Inventors, as a 
class, according to the concepts underlying the Constitution and the 
statutes that have created the patent system, possess something—call it 
what you will—which sets them apart from the workers of ordinary skill, 
and one should not go about determining obviousness under § 103 by 
inquiring into what patentees (i.e., inventors) would have known or would 
likely have done, faced with the revelations of references.231  
 
By themselves, this aspect of Judge Rich‘s statements have value as a clear recognition 
that under § 103 there remains a critical distinction between skill and invention that 
should be central to any understanding of the legal meaning of ―ordinary ski ll.‖  This 
should not be controversial – it was the central holding of Hotchkiss,232 retained in § 103 
in view of Graham.233  But Judge Rich went beyond this and added a critical insight into 
what is ―ordinary skill,‖ namely: 
 
A person of ordinary skill in the art is also presumed to be one who thinks 
along the line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who 
undertakes to innovate, whether by patient, and often expensive, 
systematic research or by extraordinary insights, it makes no difference 
which.234  
 
Unfortunately for the legal community, Standard Oil has not received the attention or 
acclaim of Winslow.  The Federal Circuit has only discussed this aspect of Standard Oil 
once, and then it was in an unpublished decision addressing an assertion that i t had been 
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misapplied to exclude workers in certain categories of technical disciplines from ever 
being considered ―persons of ordinary skill in the art.‖ 235   
Chief Judge Markey made a similar, if less clear, statement in the earlier W.L. 
Gore case.236  There, Judge Markey stated the burden on a district court conducting an 
analysis of obviousness: 
 
It is difficult but necessary that the decisionmaker forget what he or she 
has been taught at trial about the claimed invention and cast the mind back 
to the time the invention was made (often as here many years), to occupy 
the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented only with the 
references, and who is normally guided by the then-accepted wisdom in 
the art. 237 
 
While W.L. Gore has been cited for this proposition more often than the similar statement 
in Standard Oil, it has had a somewhat confusing evolution.  On its face it appears to be 
suggesting, like Standard Oil, that a ―person having ordinary skill‖ is generally not 
innovative, i.e. they are ―normally guided by the then accepted wisdom.‖  In later cases, 
though, this has been recast as the judge trying ―to consider the thinking of one of 
ordinary skill in the art, guided only by the prior art references and the then-accepted 
wisdom in the field.‖238  This tends to divorce the ―accepted wisdom‖ from being a 
limitation on the skill and innovative tendencies of the person of ―ordinary skill‖ and 
rather being an aspect of ―prior art‖ that such a person might consider.  Still, this gloss on 
W.L. Gore and the statement in Standard Oil are the most comprehensive attempts to 
construe the phrase ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ appearing in the case law 
before KSR.  This state of affairs both underscores the need for a comprehensive 
application of normal rules of statutory construction and a meaningful comparison for the 
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B. Trying to Find Defensible Meanings for “Ordinary Skill” and “Person Having 
Ordinary Skill” 
 
A striking feature of the foregoing discussion is the lack of any orderly attempt at 
statutory construction.  First, as the term is not defined in the statute itself, 239 we consult 
dictionary definitions, including Black‘s Law Dictionary, for the phrases ―ordinary skill‖ 
and ―person having ordinary skill‖ and the common usages of the individual terms 
―ordinary‖ and ―skill‖240 as a starting point to analyze this phrase within the overall 
statutory framework. 241  Then, uses of the phrase ―ordinary skill‖ before enactment of the 
statute, whether in the context of patent law ―mechanics‖ or non-patent ―persons,‖ are 
examined to see if they provide a ―judicial definition‖ that might trump this meaning to 
the extent this aspect of § 103 is truly a codification of this pre-existing law.242  Finally, 
the result of this review is compared with statements in KSR to assess if there is support 
for the Court‘s actions.     
 
 
1. The Dictionary Meaning of the Terms ―Ordinary‖ and ―Skill‖ Suggest 
Appropriate Definitions for ―Ordinary Skill‖ and ―Person Having Ordinary Skill‖ 
 
The phrase ―ordinary skill‖ is of such common use in the law, that one might 
expect to find a general meaning for it in Black’s Law Dictionary.  No such entry is to be 
found.  Rather, Black’s only defines it in the specific context of patents, and then with 
less than impressive specificity.  The phrase ―ordinary skill in the art‖ simply says:  
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ordinary skill in the art. Patents. The level of technical knowledge, 
experience, and expertise possessed by a typical engineer, scientist, 
designer, etc. in a technology that is relevant to an invention.243 
The phrase ―person with ordinary skill in the art‖ is similarly defined as:  
person with ordinary skill in the art. Patents. A fictional construct of 
the patent laws, denoting someone who has reasonably developed abilities 
in the field of the invention at issue.  The patent application must be clear 
and complete enough to teach a person skilled in the art how to make and 
use the invention without undue experimentation.  
The term ‗person skilled in the art‘ . . . has been interpreted to mean a 
person having ordinary or fair information in that particular line, not 
necessarily a person of high scientific attainments. The skill or knowledge 
to be imputed to such a person will vary with the complexity of the art to 
which the invention relates.244 
 
Unfortunately, these definitions, while no doubt combined from the study of many cases, 
do not get to the core of the phrase as used in § 103.  As interpreted in Graham, the 
phrase is intended to preserve the function of Hotchkiss in separating the patentable 
wheat of invention from the unpatentable chaff of skill.245  These definitions do not speak 
to that delineation and hence are not of much use on their own.   
The definition of ―ordinary‖ as ―typical‖ in Black’s is also circular.  Is the 
obviousness inquiry to focus on the median level of skill in the art, a sort of lowest 
common denominator?  Or a mean pulled from the entire field of practitioners, which 
may be tilted by the presence of a few outstanding individuals?  If the latter, how can a 
court ever be certain that it has not crossed the line and found a patentable invention 
obvious?   
General dictionary definitions of ―ordinary‖ aid our interpretation of § 103, but 
consideration of these definitions points out a need for further context in our analysis.  On 
the one hand, it is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) 246 as relating to 
people as ―typical of a particular group; average; without exceptional experience or 
expert knowledge,‖247 which suggests that either a mean or median person within a group 
might be ―ordinary.‖248  However, it can also suggest ―[n]ot distinguished by rank or 
position; belonging to the commonality; of low degree; pertaining to, or characteristic of, 
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the common people.‖249  In this same vein are the definitions  ―[c]ommonly practised or 
experienced; common, customary, usual‖ and ―[o]f the usual kind, such as is commonly 
met with, not singular or exceptional.‖250  These meanings would seem to favor a lowest 
common denominator rather than a median level of skill.  Interestingly, as to language, 
the OED suggests just such an approach, defining ordinary as ―that most commonly 
found or attested, spec. as contrasted with logical symbolism or a specialized 
terminology.‖251  So, if nothing else, we can say the ―ordinary‖ meaning of ―ordinary 
skill‖ should be that most commonly embraced by the appropriate sources, even if the 
resulting ―ordinary skill‖ were an average. 
However, not all sources are so split.  Webster’s Dictionary 252  is more 
consistently on the side of finding a lowest common denominator.  It does not speak to 
things that are average, but rather common and routine. 253  For example, the first listing is 
―occurring or encountered in the usual course of events: not uncommon or exceptional: 
not remarkable: Routine, Normal.‖ 254   To similar effect are the definitions of 
―characterized by common quality, merit, rank or ability: lacking in excellence, superior 
merit, uncommon appeal, or distinctive characteristics.‖ 255   Hence, barring some 
indication in the law to the contrary, it would seem that the definition in Black’s should 
be read as the most common level of skill in the art, rather than a median or average, 
consistent with the OED and Webster's on interpretation of ―ordinary‖ language.   
Black’s definition of ―skill‖ also requires some clarification.  By defining ―skill‖ 
solely in terms of ―knowledge, experience and expertise,‖ it suggests a near impossible 
set of conditions for analyzing obviousness.  These are personal traits, not readily subject 
to aggregation.  Expertise, for example, is not merely something learned, but a reflection 
of the judgment and particular experiences of an individual.  Gaining expertise in a field 
suggests that one is superior to the remainder of the field – which in turn, suggests that 
there is no way of determining ―typical‖ expertise.  
Once again, turning to more general sources provides some improvement on how 
to view ―skill,‖ although not an absolutely definitive answer.  While the OED has a 
lengthy entry on skill,256 little of it applies to the usage in § 103.  The only obviously 
applicable definition is ―[c]apability of accomplishing something with precision and 




252 As used hereinafter, ―Webster’s‖ refers to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
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253 See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1589 (3d ed. 1993). 
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certainty; practical knowledge in combination with ability; cleverness, expertness.  Also, 
an ability to perform a function, acquired or learnt with practice.‖257  The inclusion of 
―cleverness‖ and ―expertness‖ is troubling for the same reason as the Black’s definition, 
but otherwise this seems to point to a more objective framework.  
Webster’s is also suggestive of a less subjective understanding of ―skill.‖  It does 
speak to knowledge, but does so as applied knowledge rather than general information 
(―knowledge of the means or methods of accomplishing a task‖).258  Similarly, it notes 
that this term can connote ―expertness,‖ but in the sense of proficiency rather than 
ingeniousness (―the ability to use one‘s knowledge effectively and readily in execution or 
performance: technical expertness: Proficiency‖).259  Furthermore, it stresses the learned 
nature of ―skill,‖ defining it as ―dexterity, fluency, or coordination in the execution of 
learned physical or mental tasks.‖260  A ―skill‖ is defined as ―a learned power of doing a 
thing competently: a developed or acquired aptitude or ability‖ as well as ―a coordinated 
set of actions become smooth and integrated through practice.‖261 
Webster’s also provides one entry that affords significant insight on why and how 
nineteenth century courts may have seen a clear line existing between ―skill‖ or 
―workmanship‖ and ―invention.‖  This lies in the definition of ―skill‖  as ―technical 
competence without insight or understanding or the ability for further elaboration or 
development.‖262  The uses in this sense are also enlightening: ―a volume of verses which 
show some [skill] in versification, but little originality in thought or form – H.E. Starr‖; 
―frequently a person acquires certain reading [skill]s but never understands what he has 
read – John Haverstick.‖263  This meaning reflects the truth that with sufficient practice 
and the right education, most people can achieve a modicum of skill in a given field.  Far 
fewer will ever have the insight or creativity to add to the fundamental knowledge of that 
field.  To analogize, the distinction is that between a cook who can competently follow a 
recipe and make basic substitutions as necessary, and a chef who can create new dishes.  
It is that essential distinction between a pianist who knows all the keys to strike and a 
maestro who knows how to evoke emotion and feeling in a piece.  The former is skilled, 
the latter, something far rarer.   
Pulling all of these terms together suggests more objective, consistent definitions 
of ―ordinary skill‖ and ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ than those in Black’s.  
―Ordinary skill‖ would, in this view, be defined as ―the common level of technical 
competence of workers in a given field.‖  Coupled with the clear definition of ―person‖ in 
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Court precedent on obviousness, ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ would therefore 
be ―a hypothetical construct charged with knowledge of the relevant prior art and having 
the common level of technical competence of workers in a given field.‖  These 
definitions do not seek to define that minimal level of competence, thus retaining the 
flexible, art specific approach to determining what is ―ordinary skill‖ related to a 
particular patent.   
These proposals are admittedly similar to the second entry in Black’s (―reasonably 
developed abilities‖), but avoid the question of what is encompassed within one‘s 
―abilities.‖  Rather, these standards recognize proficiency as a quality of ―skill,‖ and even 
the ability to make independent use of existing knowledge, but essentially presume that 
the basic or ―ordinary‖ workers in any field are not actively innovating, but rather 
following accepted norms of the field.  Including innovation as an element of ―ordinary 
skill‖ in a particular case would depend on a finding that it was a requirement to 
successfully work in that field.  In stressing a common level of skill, rather than a median 
value, these definitions seek to minimize any risk of skewing the level too high to reflect 
the skill of the most talented and/or most experienced members of a field, who are apt to 
have ―extraordinary,‖ rather than ―ordinary,‖ skill and may well be more capable of 
innovating and disregarding the norms of the field.  These present viable working 
definitions of ―ordinary skill‖ and ―person having ordinary skill‖ that will provide 
practitioners, judges, and even jurors with significant guidance in framing the inquiry into 
the particular level of ―ordinary skill‖ required by Graham. 
 
 
2. Prior Supreme Court uses of the term ―Ordinary Skill‖ in and out of Patent Law  
Support Finding it Refers to a Level of Minimal Competence 
 
A review of the case law preceding the enactment of § 103 confirms Federico‘s 
account that ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ is new to the law in this section. 264  
Hence, there is no literal codification of a judicially defined term from which to take the 
statutory construction.265  Still, as Graham determined that § 103 was meant to codify the 
principle of Hotchkiss rather than changing the standard for patentability, 266  it is 
worthwhile to trace the Court‘s various uses of ―ordinary skill‖ before 1952 in an effort 
to understand how the judicial uses compare to the proposed definitions of ―ordinary 
skill‖ as ―the common level of technical competence of workers in a given field‖ and 
―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ as ―a hypothetical construct charged with 
knowledge of the relevant prior art and having the common level of technical competence 
of workers in a given field.‖   
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The earliest cases, such as Hotchkiss and Reckendorfer, do not speak of ―ordinary 
skill‖ at all, but instead speak of ―mechanical skill‖267 or a ―skilful [sic] mechanic.‖ 268  
Even as ―ordinary skill‖ was introduced into this analysis, the focus remained on the 
distinction between ―mechanics‖ or ―workmen in the trade‖ on the one hand and 
―inventors‖ on the other.  For example, in Mosler, the components and techniques of 
making fire proof safes were all found in the prior art.269  In finding a want of invention, 
the Court stated that using the techniques and old materials were ―only what would occur 
to a mechanic of ordinary skill.‖270   The Court, in analyzing the one piece button 
construction patent of Krementz, analyzed whether it demonstrated more that the 
―ordinary skill of a mechanic.‖271  In passing on the validity of the patent that enhanced 
the direct casting of steel by adding a tempering reservoir, the Court similarly stated that 
the fundamental question was whether it was an improvement that any ―mechanic of 
ordinary skill and intelligence‖ would recognize. 272  Finally, in Whitman Saddle Co., 273 
the Court analyzed a patent for a saddletree both for validity and infringement.  It found 
that given the wide variety of styles in the prior art and the evidence that it was 
customary to vary styles in almost every style, the primary features shown were simply 
the act of combining two halves of different designs, an ―exercise of the ordinary skill of 
workmen of the trade.‖274  As a result, the validity of the patent had to rest in other 
details, which in turn prohibited a finding of infringement.275 
The repeated use of the terms ―mechanic‖ and ―workmen‖ further buttresses the 
idea that the concern in assessing ―ordinary skill‖ is with establishing a baseline of 
expected competence.  Then, the inquiry of obviousness requires assessing whether 
something more is reflected in the purported invention.  There are several applicable 
definitions of ―mechanic‖ in the OED, all of which suggest the difference between skill 
and invention lies in the level of ingenuity and creativity employed.  They include 
―[h]aving a manual occupation; working at a trade;‖ ―[o]ne who is employed in a manual 
occupation; a handicraftsman;‖ and ―[a] skilled workman, esp. one who is concerned with 
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the making or use of machinery.‖276  Similarly, Webster’s defines ―mechanic‖ as ―manual 
labor or employment,‖ ―Handicraft,‖ ―a manual worker: Artisan,‖ and ―a man skilled in 
the construction or operation of machines or vehicles run by machines: Machinist.‖ 277   
The inference from these cases that there is a distinction between physical 
dexterity or competence and invention was made explicit in the Hobbs case.278  There, the 
patentee had conceived of a significant improvement in the process of reinforcing the 
corners of boxes by automatically dispensing and attaching tape. 279   The defendants 
claimed actual technical innovations were simple mechanical improvements to machines 
for creating labels that were affixed to boxes and hence not inventive.280  Even crediting 
the simplicity of the changes, the Court found that the initial conception was a ―‗a 
creative thought whose presence would convert the mechanic into an inventor.‘‖281 
Thus, the case law from which § 103 was crafted seems to support defining 
―ordinary skill‖ or a ―person having ordinary skill‖ as reflecting ―technical competence,‖ 
but presumably not innovation.  It aptly fits Reckendorfer’s  line between ―mechanical 
skill,‖ which through the application of the teachings of the prior art can create an 
aggregation reflecting ―[p]erfection of workmanship‖ which is still not patentable, and 
―inventive genius,‖ which builds upon the prior art to create a new, jointly acting 
composition.282  It similarly honors the Hotchkiss distinction between the ―skilful [sic] 
mechanic‖ and ―inventor.‖283 
Further buttressing this understanding of ―ordinary skill‖ as a lowest common 
denominator of competence are the uses of the term outside of the area of obviousness or 
invention before the enactment of § 103.  The term first appears in Supreme Court 
precedent in a case regarding the liability of a ship owner for damages from an 
accident. 284  This body of law appears to be a forerunner of modern negligence and 
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mitigation obligations.285  While it appears mainly in admiralty286 and transportation287 
matters, it suggests something akin to the ―reasonable man‖ standard of modern parlance.  
Like the suggested definition of ―common level of technical competence‖ in a patent 
context, it is normative in character.  There is no suggestion that sea captains or railroad 
engineers exercising ―ordinary skill‖ would be expected to be innovative or clever in any 
fashion. Instead, they simply act in accordance with the accepted norms of their 
professions in light of a given set of circumstances. 
The other significant use of the term ―ordinary skill‖ prior to the enactment of § 
103 was assessing the compliance of patent specifications with the enablement 
requirement.288  For example, in upholding Alexander Graham Bell‘s fundamental patent 
on the process underlying the telephone, the Court stated that, in addition to setting forth 
the process employed in telephonic transmission,‖ 
 
he also described, with sufficient precision to enable one of ordinary skill 
in such matters to make it, a form of apparatus which, if used in the way 
pointed out, would produce the required effect, receive the words, and 
carry them to and deliver them at the appointed place.289 
 
The ultimate measure of enablement of Bell‘s patent was the success of others in actually 
constructing and using the disclosed device, though Bell‘s own prototype had not 
achieved the clarity he had sought.290  Based on this evidence, the Court stated that:  
 
a good mechanic, of proper skill in matters of the kind, can take the patent, 
and, by following the specification strictly, can, without more, construct 
                                                 
285 See In re the Baltimore, 75 U.S. (1 Wall.) 377, 387 (1869) (―Persons injured in their 
property by collision are entitled to full indemnity for their loss, but the respondents are not liable 
for such damages as might have been reasonably avoided by the exercise of ordinary skill and 
diligence, after the collision, on the part of those in charge of the injured ship.‖).  
286 Id.; see also Smith v. Burnett, 173 U.S. 430, 437 (1899); In re the Webb, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 
406, 416 (1871).  
287 See Gleeson v. Va. Midland Ry. Co., 140 U.S. 435, 440 (1891) (rejecting assertion that 
landslide on railroad cut that caused accident was ―Act of God‖ and imposing duty of 
maintenance for such conditions on carrier, stating ―[o]rdinary skill would enable the engineers to 
foresee the result, and ordinary prudence should lead the company to guard against it‖).  
288 See, e.g., Brooks v. Fiske, 56 U.S. (1 How.) 212, 224 (1853) (quoting prior case as stating 
―the specifications . . . are sufficiently full to enable a mechanic with ordinary skill to build a 
machine‖).  
289 Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 535 (1888). 
290 See id. at 535-36. 




an apparatus which, when used in the way pointed out, will do all that it is 
claimed the method or process will do.291 
 
Note that the Court did not hold that any person with a modicum of skill had to achieve 
success.  In fact, the Court rejected a challenge based on claims of failure by some of 
alleged skill.  At the same time, the Court made it clear the specification was valid 
because it did not require innovation or ingenuity on the part of those of skill in the art to 
succeed. 292  Yet again, the context and usage indicates that the target audience of a 
―mechanic‖ of ―ordinary skill‖ is one who can follow, but does not lead or seek to blaze a 
new trail.   
 Similarly indicative of ―ordinary skill‖ as a lower threshold of competence are the 
Court‘s statements in Expanded Metal.293  In this case, the Court resolved conflicting 
rulings on the validity of a patent to an improved method of forming ―open or reticulated 
metal work‖ in favor of patentability.  Quoting the prior ruling of the Sixth Circuit, the 
Court noted that ―‗[i]t is not stated just what the form shall be, but only ordinary skill in 
mechanics would suggest that the outer side of the cutter might be beveled or a shoulder 
might be formed thereon to carry down the strand when severed.‘‖294  The gap between 
the specification and any undisclosed apparatus necessary to carry out the process was 
bridged not by the ingenuity of persons of skill in the art, but rather from the fact the 
necessary mechanism ―‗was common in the mechanical arts.‘‖295  It was not just that the 
more skillful persons in the art could carry out this technique, but that it ―‗could be 
arranged by any skilful [sic] mechanic.‘‖296   
 From the foregoing, it appears that ―ordinary skill‖ has consistently been used as a 
common denominator or lower threshold of competence.  While the level of ―ordinary 
skill‖ clearly varies with circumstance, there is nothing suggestive of requiring persons of 
―ordinary skill‖ to do any more than exercise the common competence of their callings.  
Indeed, any higher burden on such persons would appear to be at odds with the policies 
underlying these cases – establishing negligence liability on the one hand and ensuring 
that patents are clear enough to be used by others of skill in the art without undue 
experimentation on the other.  As a result, this law as a whole appears to support the 
                                                 
291 Id. at 536. 
292 See id. at 535-36 (This is the source of the maxim ―[t]he law does not require that a 
discoverer or inventor, in order to get a patent for a process, must have succeeded in bringing his 
art to the highest degree of perfection; it is enough if he describes his method with sufficient 
clearness and precision to enable those skilled in the matter to understand what the process is, and 
if he points out some practicable way of putting it into operation.‖).  
293 Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909). 
294 Id. at 380 (quoting Expanded Metal Co. v. Gen. Fireproofing Co., 164 F. 849, 853 (6th Cir. 
1908)) (emphasis added).  
295 Id. at 380 (quoting Expanded Metal Co., 164 F. at 853). 
296 Id. (emphasis added). 




proposed definitions of ―ordinary skill‖ as ―the common level of technical competence of 
workers in a given field‖ and ―person having ordinary skill in the art‖ as ―a hypothetical 
construct charged with knowledge of the relevant prior art and having the common level 
of technical competence of workers in a given field.‖ 
 
 
C. KSR’s Changes to the Nature of “Persons Having Ordinary Skill” Contradict 
Controlling Precedent and the Intent of § 103 
 
As noted at the outset of this analysis, the central issue in KSR was whether or not 
a ―teaching, suggestion, or motivation‖ had to be found as an absolute predicate to 
combining references in support of a claim of obviousness. 297  It was only after dealing 
with this issue that the Court felt it necessary to comment on the nature and talents of ―a 
person having ordinary skill in the art.‖298  Unfortunately, the Court‘s statements about 
persons of skill in the art in KSR reflect a fundamental contradiction with its own 
precedent, including Hotchkiss, Graham, and cases in between.  Individually and 
collectively, they effectively (and improperly) overturn Graham’s finding that § 103 
embodied, rather than altered, the ―Hotchkiss condition‖ of inventiveness and raise the 
bar for patentability beyond that intended by Congress.299  As such, they are improper, 
and either the Court or Congress should correct them. 
As Graham itself found, as long as the Congressional framework is within 
constitutional bounds (and it found § 103 was), it is not the place of the courts to interfere 
with the intent expressed in statutes such as § 103. 300  That, though, is precisely what the 
Court did in KSR when it repeatedly asserted that ―persons having ordinary skill‖ are 
necessarily imbued with ―creativity‖ and are apt to solve ―puzzles‖ from multiple pieces 
of prior art. 301  From the plain language of the statute, and consistent with Graham, the 
                                                 
297 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007). 
298 Id. at 1734, 1740-42. 
299 Graham v. John Deere of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (―We believe that this 
legislative history, as well as other sources, shows that the revision was not intended by Congress 
to change the general level of patentable invention. We conclude that the section was intended 
merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition, with 
congressional directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be 
patented are a prerequisite to patentability.‖) (emphasis added).  
300 Id. at 6 (―Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, 
implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best 
effectuates the constitutional aim. . . . It is the duty of the Commissioner of Patents and of the 
courts in the administration of the patent system to give effect to the constitutional standard by 
appropriate application, in each case, of the statutory scheme of the Congress.‖).  
301 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741-42 (instructing courts to ―take account of the inferences and 
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ‖; stating that ―[a] person of 
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,‖ and that ―in many cases a 




focus of § 103 is on differentiating between expressions of skill on the one hand and 
inventions on the other. 302   It does not say anything about skillful persons having 
creativity, and the Court could find no support for its various pronouncements beyond 
―common sense.‖303  
The reason that the Court could not find any more compelling support for its 
conclusion is because, at its root, ―creativity‖ has no necessary relationship to ―skill.‖  As 
discussed above, the term ―skill‖ refers to the application of knowledge, dexterity and 
competence.304  As such, a minimal level of necessary or ―ordinary‖ skill can be assessed 
fairly objectively in a given art.  ―Creativity,‖ on the other hand, is defined as ―the quality 
of being creative: ability to create.‖305 ―Creative,‖ in turn, refers to ―the power or quality 
of creating: given to creation.‖306  ―Create,‖ ―creating,‖ and ―creation‖ all refer to the 
ability to invent, imagine, or otherwise bring forth new matter, rather than imitating or 
following the known art or standards.307  Creativity is an individual mental capacity, not a 
learned ability.  It will necessarily vary significantly among individuals, even those with 
the same level of skill in a given art.  As a result, assessing an ―ordinary‖ level of 
―creativity‖ seems to be a matter of conjecture rather than objectivity.  Fundamentally, 
there is no logical overlap in possessing skill and possessing creativity.  It is entirely 
possible for a person to be highly skilled – that is, proficient in a given trade or skill – 
without ever diverging from established norms or creating anything of note.  
Additionally, KSR’s inclusion of creativity as an element of skill blurs the line 
between skill and invention that § 103 seeks to create.  If ―persons having ordinary skill‖ 
are necessarily creative, they are also necessarily inventive.  The impropriety of including 
a creative or inventive capability in the qualities of a ―person having ordinary skill,‖ 
when that hypothetical person is the benchmark for determining whether a patent 
demonstrates invention, should be self-evident.  If any further evidence is necessary, 
though, it is shown in the most applicable definition for the term ―invention‖ in 
                                                                                                                                                 
person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of 
a puzzle‖). 
302 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18. 
303 See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741-42. 
304 See discussion supra Part III.B.a. 
305 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 532 (3d ed. 2002). 
306 Id.   
307 Id. (defining ―create‖ as ―to bring into existence : make out of noting and for the first time,‖ 
―to cause to be or to produce by . . . mental . . . action,‖ and ―to make or bring into existence 
something new (as something of an imaginative or artistic character) : Invent <quick to imitate 
but powerless to [create]>‖; defining ―creation‖ as ―the act or practice of making, inventing, 
devising, fashioning, or producing‖).  




Webster’s, which in relevant part states it is ―a device or process that is not only novel 
and useful but also reflects creative genius.‖308   
Following KSR‘s inclusion of ―ordinary‖ creativity and inventiveness within the 
scope of a ―person having ordinary skill‖ would thus require the patent to demonstrate 
some level of ―extraordinary inventiveness‖ or creativity.  This is not what the case law 
or § 103 requires.  Hotchkiss clearly states that the requirement for demonstrating 
patentability is that it reflects invention rather than skill, not that it exceed some 
indeterminate threshold of ―ordinary‖ creativity or inventiveness. 309   Similarly, 
Reckendorfer noted that any co-action or new composition would be inventive, rather 
than skillful, because the necessary modicum of creativity is shown. 310  Krementz stressed 
the importance, despite the difficult nature of the task, of finding the line between skill 
and invention311 – a near impossibility if inventiveness lies on both sides of the equation 
and a greater than ordinary level of creativity or inventiveness must be shown.  Such a 
new requirement is plainly inconsistent with Graham‘s finding that § 103 was not meant 
to change the standard of patentability from pre-existing law.312  It is an inappropriate 
alteration of Congressional intent, and should be disregarded. 
There also seems to be a lack of support for the Court‘s view that persons of 
―ordinary skill‖ can or would routinely create puzzles from multiple patents with no 
external motivation to do so, thus suggesting most combinations are obvious. 313  In fac t, 
it is contrary to many leading cases analyzing the question o f invention or non-
obviousness.  Reckendorfer noted that where two prior art inventions are combined in a 
novel way to create a new function or outcome, the resulting structure is patentable. 314  
Goodyear Dental found the combination of rubber plates and artificial teeth was 
patentable because it resulted in a novel, improved method, despite combining prior 
art.315  Anderson’s-Black Rock, while requiring ―synergy,‖ limited that to a requirement 
that a combination be more than the sum of its parts.316  Similarly, while Sakraida317 held 
a dairy barn flushing system obvious, it was not because of any sort of arts and crafts 
with the prior art.  To the contrary, it reflected an aggregation of old elements with no 
                                                 
308 Id. at 1188 (emphasis added). 
309 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850). 
310 See Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 357 (1875). 
311 See Krementz v. S. Cottle Co., 148 U.S. 556, 559-61 (1893). 
312 Graham v. John Deere of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
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new function,318 and thus is nothing more than an update of Hotchkiss and Reckendorfer.  
None of these cases suggest the prior art would be routinely raided and re-arranged by 
persons of skill in the art to produce ranges of supposedly obvious combinations. 319  This 
is an unfounded extension of the law, and it appears designed to thwart the balance 
Congress struck in passing § 103.  
Finally, the notion that the presence of a device in one art will somehow lead to 
―predictable,‖ presumptively obvious ―variations of it, either in the same field or a 
different one,‖320 is at odds with both precedent and the structure of the statute.  This 
assertion suggests that ―persons having ordinary skill‖ in one art would somehow possess 
knowledge of other, non-analogous fields in order to make use of developments in those 
fields.  There is no statutory or legal predicate for this idea.  The statute requires an 
analysis of the ―differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior 
art‖ from the perspective of a ―person having ordinary skill in the art to which said  
subject matter pertains,‖ not against the perspective of artisans in other arts. 321  The 
fictional person of skill in the art, in keeping with Dann, is only charged with knowledge 
of the art within the relevant field.322  Hence, non-analogous art – art from distinct fields 
– is not within the scope of a proper consideration of obviousness, nor is it a basis for 
presuming variations of such art in a different field are obvious.  
The Court derives this proposition from cases such as Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea,323 Sakraida, and Anderson’s-Black Rock, but it ignores the primary limitation of all 
of those cases.  In each one, the concern was with using combinations of materials as they 
were known in the same field without alteration of their function. 324  In none did someone 
                                                 
318 Id. 
319 Even the suggestive tableau of Winslow, with the relevant art on the wall, does not go this 
far.  See In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (C.C.P.A. 1966).  Rather, it presents the more 
likely result that when a person of skill in the art comes up against a narrow problem not 
addressed by any existing art, they would look to the art for a way to improve the basic design.  
Id.  This is not what would typically be thought of as a puzzle, as all the second reference 
supplied was a single piece.   
320 Id.; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007) (emphasis added) (―When a 
work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt 
variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can 
implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.‖). 
321 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  
322 Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229 (1976). 
323 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950). 
324 Id. at 152 (describing combination of existing merchant counter, three sided rack and rails 
as ―[t]wo and two have been added together, and still they make only four‖); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 280 n.6, 281-82 (1976) (all elements were admitted to be old in the field of 
dairy barn cleaning); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-62 




combine art previously unknown to a field, which would necessarily have created a 
function previously unknown in that field.   
Moreover, even within the same field, this statement raises more questions than it 
answers.  There would not seem to be a means for accurately assessing when a 
―variation‖ is ―predictable.‖  The very fact a court or the Patent Office is engaging in an 
obviousness analysis indicates that no party has made the variation before the 
patentee/applicant, so the only way to assess its ―predictability‖ would appear to be 
improper hindsight.325  Hobbs also illustrates the inconsistency of this approach with the 
historic standards for patentability.326  There, the patent was asserted to lack invention 
owing to the mechanical simplicity of adapting prior art carton labeling devices to the 
claimed, prior art function of reinforcing boxes with tape. 327   To put it in KSR‘s 
framework, the use of stamping devices would seem to be a fairly evident or predictable 
variation. The Hobbs Court, however, held that the adaptation reflected ―‗a creative 
thought whose presence would convert the mechanic into an inventor.‘‖ 328  Once more, 
the Court‘s statements reflect an alteration of Congressional intent, to the extent § 103 
was meant to codify case law such as Hobbs.  
In sum, the Court‘s statements in KSR discussing the talents, knowledge, and 
nature of ―persons having ordinary skill‖ are in conflict with its own precedent as well as 
the text and settled intent of § 103.  These comments were not necessary to resolving the 
central issue on which certiorari was granted.  While they may therefore ultimately be 
cast aside as colorful dicta, they create a substantial risk that KSR will be used to erect a 
higher bar for patentability than Congress ever intended in passing § 103.  This would 
devalue patents and otherwise return courts to the skepticism towards patents that this 
section was meant to address.  Given Congress‘ failure to pass comprehensive patent 
reform since 1952, a Congressional repeal of these comments  seems unlikely.  Therefore, 




V. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF KSR 
 
As troubling as the implications of KSR are for most patents and applicants facing 
obviousness challenges, the severity of the consequences vary by field.  While the case 
dealt with a mechanical combination patent, several of the statements in the case suggest 
the most severe questions may surround the continuing availability of patents for 
biological and chemical compounds.  Additionally, the concept of imbuing ―persons of 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1969) (invalidating combination of heater and paving machine both known in the asphalt paving 
business).  
325 See, e.g., KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740-41. 
326 Hobbs v. Beach, 180 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1901). 
327 Id. 
328 Id. at 393 (quoting Beach v. Am.-Box Mach. Co., 63 F. 597, 601 (C.C.N.Y. 1894)). 




ordinary skill‖ with creativity and inquisitiveness beyond their immediate field could 
have wide reaching impacts in other areas of patent law.  The following analysis looks at 
a few such issues to illustrate the potential implications of this case.  While it is by no 
means comprehensive, it is hoped that illustrating the (potentially) unintentional but 
logical consequences of the Court‘s statements might motivate the Court or Congress to 
take action to restore the prior understanding of obviousness and establish an appropriate 
meaning for ―ordinary skill.‖ 
 
 
A. Are DNA Sequences Generally Obvious? 
 
It may seem odd to claim that KSR’s holding will impact the chemical arts, such 
as patenting genetic DNA sequences.329  After all, KSR dealt directly with a mechanical 
combination patent.  However, the Court‘s comments on the doctrines of ―predictable 
variations,‖ applying known techniques, 330  and ―obvious to try‖ 331  may have their 
greatest impact in the life sciences.  This owes to the fact that many of the patents in this 
field approximate discoveries of new territory, rather than creations.  That is, they are 
often the result of applying known and somewhat predictable techniques repeatedly to 
                                                 
329 See Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (―A gene is a chemical 
compound, albeit a complex one, and it is well established in our law that conception of a 
chemical compound requires that the inventor be able to define it so as to distinguish it from other 
materials, and to describe how to obtain it.‖).  
330 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740 (―If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable 
variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to 
improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would 
improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual 
application is beyond his or her skill.‖). 
331 Id. at 1742 (―When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there 
are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason 
to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated 
success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that 
instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 
103.‖).  Although ―obvious to try‖ was not at issue in KSR, and this discussion on its face broadly 
rejects the concept of ―obvious to try‖ as insufficient proof of obviousness, the Federal Circuit 
has subsequently sought to modify the phrase ―finite number‖ and hence limit its application in 
the chemical arts.  See Ortho-McNeil Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (―The passage above in KSR posits a situation with a finite, and in the context of 
the art, small or easily traversed, number of options that would convince an ordinarily skilled 
artisan of obviousness.‖); see also Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (quoting Ortho-McNeil while omitting ―context of the art‖ language, noting perceived 
unpredictability of chemical arts).  This modification is not only uncalled for in light of the plain 
language of the Court in KSR, it does not seem to square with the idea expressed in Enzo Biochem 
that in the correct circumstances a biological deposit can suffice as a written description of all 
potential mutations and combinations of that deposited material, despite their potentially vast 
numbers.  See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 




explore unknown areas of the art, rather than innovating in the techniques themselves.  
Given KSR‘s critique of the use of known techniques as rendering obvious results, 332 this 
would appear to pose a substantial risk to patents in these areas of the life sciences. 
One area of research that involves repetitive use of known techniques to achieve 
similar results is the discovery of full or partial DNA sequences.  As any student of 
evidence knows, the measure of good scientific technique lies in part in its ability to be 
accurately repeated and survive testing by others in the field.333  By that standard, DNA 
science is about as good as it gets.  The basic techniques for collecting, cloning, and 
screening DNA are well-known.334  Sequencing DNA, an arduous and highly specialized 
skill just a few decades ago, is now ―a standard procedure in every molecular biology 
laboratory.‖335  Essentially anyone can obtain a particular target sequence with the right 
samples and lab conditions by applying ―known techniques.‖  
As everyone in the art knows the basic techniques and can obtain meaningful 
results, it may be questioned how the entire field has not already become saturated with 
patents.  Two principles have largely prevented a handful of patents from rendering other 
claims obvious.  The first is the holding in the Deuel 336 case that particular DNA 
sequences are not rendered obvious from the knowledge of general techniques to find 
DNA or even the knowledge of the structure of the protein expressed by a gene 
sequence.337  Even the similarity of the same genes between species is not enough. 338  
This is so despite the fact that the known DNA sequences of a gene of interest in one 
species are often used as the basis for probes to seek the same sequence in other 
species. 339   The second principle is that the specificity required to describe DNA 
sufficiently to demonstrate conception and meet the written description requirement 
prevents parties from claiming much more than the precise sequence or compound they 
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333 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) (noting scientific 
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334 See James D. Watson et al., Recombinant DNA: Genes and Genomes – A Short Course 82-
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336 See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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338 See Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (rejecting assertion that 
knowledge of monkey DNA sequence for EPO rendered human sequence obvious, stating 
―[w]hile the idea of using the monkey gene to probe for a homologous human gene may have 
been obvious to try, the realization of that idea would not have been obvious.‖). 
339 Id.; see Watson, supra note 333, at 88, 315-16.  




have identified.340  Hence, under current standards it is difficult to either obtain a broad 
patent on a range of DNA sequences, or for any genetic sequence to be prima facie 
obvious. 
Even with these restrictions, DNA research often winds up in a race to the patent 
office.  It is not uncommon for multiple laboratories to investigate the same target gene or 
compound during the same time.  Owing to the common techniques employed, the results 
will be the same or nearly identical and are often obtained within close proximity in time.  
In turn, the PTO is forced to sift through these claims in multi-party interferences (that is, 
claims by more than one application for the same subject matter), a highly technical task 
focused on determining conception and invention dates.  341   Concerns with being 
entangled in such fights may have led researchers to file claims once they know a partial 
sequence, even if there is no apparent use for it. 342 It has also led to filings seeking to 
claim all potential variations of DNA within a genus.343   
The Federal Circuit has relied on a failure to provide an adequate written 
description 344  or a lack of utility 345  to reject such claims.  In the case of written 
description, the Lilly decision and cases employing its invocation of this requirement 
have led to a lively debate among academics and a minority of the Federal Circuit over 
whether the requirement even makes sense or can be applied in a meaningful, consistent 
                                                 
340 See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (―An adequate written 
description of a DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and 
reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA itself. 
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341 See Frazer v. Schlagel, 498 F.3d 1283, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that interference 
regarding vaccine for Human Papillomaviruses derived from DNA was initially among four 
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342 See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370-74 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting claims to short, 
fragmentary gene sequences for failure to demonstrate utility).  
343 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(affirming findings that claims to human, mammalian, and vertebrate DNA for expressing insulin 
failed written description requirement despite disclosure of amino acid sequence for human 
insulin and rat DNA). 
344 Id. 
345 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370-74. 




manner.346  The invocation of utility in Fisher likewise led Judge Rader to note this was 
being used inappropriately in an effort to overcome the limitations of Deuel.347  What has 
not been meaningfully challenged, however, is the central holding of Deuel that 
obviousness is generally inapplicable to novel DNA sequences. 
If KSR means what it says, this should change.  KSR asserts that, absent 
something beyond normal skill in the application of the technique, predictable variations 
and the repeated use of known techniques lead to obvious results. 348  This is precisely the 
nature of DNA technology.  On the one hand, it can be argued that discovering particular 
DNA sequences, particularly previously unclaimed species, is little more than seeking out 
the predictable variations of known DNA sequences.  Even more clearly, almost all new 
sequences determined at this point are the result of applying known, predictable 
techniques again and again.  The creativity of the process lies in determining what to look 
for, not how to look for it.  But forming such a plan has consistently been rejected as 
showing conception of a claim to a sequence,349 and would not seem to overcome an 
assertion of obviousness. 
Taking KSR to its logical conclusion would thus have a significant impact on 
patents to DNA sequences.  Generally, sequences in a field where related DNA were 
known (which would be a significant percentage of cases) would be prima facie obvious.  
Only DNA sequences that were the result of some novel technique would seem to have a 
chance at patentability.  It remains to be seen if this invigoration of obviousness is 
something the Supreme Court comprehended or the marketplace for patents would 
tolerate.  Only time will tell. 
 
 
B. Does KSR Change the Standard of Enablement or Challenge the Written Description 
Doctrine? 
 
In relevant part, § 112 of the patent act requires that the specification of a patent 
                                                 
346 See Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing en banc) (―[T]his court provides no 
neutral standard of application for its evolving written description doctrine.‖); Univ. of Rochester 
v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1309, 1314-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting 
from order denying rehearing en  
banc) (cataloging extensive academic critiques of Lilly and/or written description requirement) 
(Rochester II).   
347 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1381-82 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
348 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740, 1742 (2007). 
349 See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 
1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) (―[A] patent 
is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful 
conclusion.‖); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Brenner). 




contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms 
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with 
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.350 
 
The concept of enabling a patent through its specification has existed in the patent law for 
more than 150 years.351  ―Although not explicitly stated in § 112, to be enabling, the 
specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full 
scope of the claimed invention without ‗undue experimentation.‘‖ 352 The idea behind this 
requirement is that if a person of skill in the art cannot make use of the full scope of the 
invention based on its description in the patent, then the patentee has failed to provide 
adequate consideration for the benefit of a right of exclusion. 353 
Of slightly more recent vintage is the view that this section also requires the 
patent to have an explicit enough ―written description‖ that a person of ―ordinary skill‖ 
can understand the exact scope of what the patentee invented. 354  Unlike enablement, 
―written description‖ cases turn on the idea that the ―public notice‖ function of patents 
requires a patentee to ―describe the claimed invention so that one skilled in the art can 
recognize what is claimed.‖355  Despite this language, the focus of this doctrine is not on 
whether a person of skill in the art understands the full scope of the claim – if a claim is 
not fatally indefinite (a distinct requirement of § 112), it is necessarily comprehensible by 
such a person.356  Instead, the cases really turn on the specification documents that the 
                                                 
350 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006).  
351 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175-76 (1852) (assessing whether 
specification was clear enough to be understood by a ―mechanic of ordinary skill‖); Woodworth 
v. Wilson, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 712, 716 (1846) (same). 
352 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (paraphrasing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 
488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991)); see also Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1365 (quoting Wright). 
353 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (―[A]s part of the quid pro 
quo of the patent bargain, the applicant's specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art 
to practice the full scope of the claimed invention.‖).  
354 See Univ. of Rochester v. GD Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 921-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(tracing principle, in theory, to 1940s C.C.P.A. precedent and comments on ―written description‖ 
generally even further) (Rochester I).  But see Rochester II, 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(―In 1997, this court for the first time applied the written description language of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
¶ 1 as a general disclosure requirement in place of enablement, rather than in its traditional role as 
a doctrine to prevent applicants from adding new inventions to an older disclosure.‖). 
355 Rochester I, 358 F.3d at 922-23 (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 
956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
356 See Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(―[T]his [indefiniteness] standard is met where an accused infringer shows by clear and 
convincing evidence that a skilled artisan could not discern the boundaries of the claim based on 




―the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed.‖ 357  In other words, the 
issue is whether a person of skill in the art would recognize the full scope of the claim as 
construed in the teachings of the specification.  If not, then the claim was overbroad in 
that it exceeded the written description and is rendered invalid as a result. 
KSR did not seek to address either of these requirements.  Historically, both 
enablement and written description requirements are measured from what a person of 
ordinary skill would understand from the disclosure of the patent. 358  In neither case is the 
patent required to spell out information that is known in the art. 359  While the burden for 
attacking a granted patent for failure to satisfy either condition is on a defendant by clear 
and convincing evidence,360 a case is typically made by showing some gap between the 
literal language of the specification and the claims as construed, sometimes (but not 
always) coupled with some testimony that the prior art would not provide the means to 
bridge the gap.361  The burden then effectively shifts to the patentee to explain how a 
person of skill in the art would really understand any gap.362   
If KSR really means what it says, it raises some significant questions about the 
continuing propriety of these requirements, at least as currently applied.  Both 
enablement and the written description requirement suggest that persons of skill in the art 
must be led through every aspect of a patent not explicitly understood in the prior art, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history, as well as her knowledge of the 
relevant art area.‖). 
357 Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
358 See Rochester I, 358 F.3d at 922-23 (written description); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 
1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (enablement). 
359 See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (applying written 
description requirement, finding that claims did not need to recite particular DNA sequences 
because claims were not limited to sequence and specification demonstrated that several  
sequences were known and on deposit); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (enablement). 
360 Monsanto Co., 459 F.3d at 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (written description); AK Steel Corp. 
v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238-39  (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enablement).  
361 Automotive Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1283-84 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (finding that patent, while disclosing mechanical side impact sensor, did not enable the 
use of electronic sensors and hence didn‘t enable full scope of claim); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 
Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that as claims covered injector 
systems both with and without pressure jackets, but specification included only jacketed systems, 
the claims were not enabled) (Liebel-Flarsheim II); Univ. of Rochester v. GD Searle & Co., Inc., 
358 F.3d 916, 925-26 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting lack of disclosure of any compound to satisfy 
claimed function of inhibiting Cox-2 enzyme). 
362 Rochester I, 358 F.3d at 925-26 (noting lower court‘s reliance on absence of testimony by 
patentee‘s experts as to how compound required by claimed method would be identified by 
persons of skill in the art). 




with no allowance for innovation or insight on their part.  This, in turn, is directly 
contradictory to the finding in KSR that ―[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of 
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.‖363  An even-handed application of KSR would 
indicate that a patent would be valid so long as persons of ―ordinary skill‖ could 
recognize the logical scope and limits of the specification through application of their 
native intellect and creativity, rather than solely from the prior art. While the proof of 
where this innovative talent ends might appear to be difficult to discern, it is no more so 
than attempting to assess what ―ordinary creativity‖ will be for the purposes of 
obviousness.  It is doubtful that the Court intended this consequence, but the alternative 
would be to define ―persons of ordinary skill‖ differently for each distinct analysis, a 
result that would render patent law a Byzantine labyrinth of unimaginable dimensions.  
 
 
B. The Impact of Creativity on Claim Construction 
 
Claim construction – the process of determining the meaning of patent claims – is 
a central concept in patent law.  As claims define the invention, it is a necessary 
component of determining infringement. 364   It likewise is a necessary first step in 
assessing the validity of a claim.365  It is even used to determine whether a person made a 
sufficient contribution to the claimed invention to be considered an inventor. 366  It is, in 
short, ubiquitous.  
Claims are interpreted, in the first instance, from the perspective of persons of 
ordinary skill in the art.367  This is because patents are not written for the use of lay 
people but for others within a given field.  This fact has led to a dichotomy in claim 
construction cases.  Some cases endorse the use of general purpose dictionaries, at least 
when a term lacks a clear meaning in the art.368  Other cases suggest that where a term 
lacks a clear meaning in the art, it must be defined solely by resort to the specification. 369  
While the latest statement of the full Federal Circuit endorses both views in particular 
                                                 
363 Id. 
364 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (―An 
infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court determines the scope and meaning of the 
patent claims asserted . . . and then the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly 
infringing device . . . .‖) (citation omitted). 
365 Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
366 See Trovan, Ltd. v. Sokymat SA, 299 F.3d 1292, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
367 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
368 See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (using 
general dictionary meaning for ―vertical‖ after assessing that there was no meaning in the art).  
369 Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 




cases,370 KSR‘s recognition of creativity in persons of ordinary skill challenges the latter 
view, as a term can almost always be inferentially understood more generally than its use 
in a particular context. 
As discussed above, dictionaries are standard tools of statutory construction. 371  
As the Federal Circuit justified finding that claim construction is a matter of law on the 
similarity of a patent to a statute,372 it should not be surprising that patent terms are often 
construed in light of dictionary definitions.  These can be general purpose dictionaries, 
technical dictionaries, or both.  For example, in Verizon,373 the court rejected a proposed 
construction of ―destination‖ as used in ―destination address‖ where it conflicted with a 
general dictionary definition of the term and the specification did not appear to require 
the proposed definition.374  Similarly, in LB Plastics,375 the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
construction of ―weld‖ based on both general purpose and technical dictionaries.376 
Not all panels of the Federal Circuit agree with the common use of dictionaries, 
though.  A striking example of the contrary view is Vanderlande.377  There, a patented 
conveyor belt sorting system included a ―glide surface‖ intended to improve the action of 
a ―diverter shoe‖ in pushing objects off the conveyor belt to spur tracks. 378   The 
defendant attempted to define the ―glide‖ in glide surface as referring to the small pieces 
of plastic or cloth that make furniture more movable.379  While properly rejecting this 
tortured definition, the panel took a particularly harsh stance on the use of dictionaries.  
The panel held that unless there was positive evidence that those skilled in the art ―would 
understand a claim term to have the same meaning in the art as that term has in common, 
lay usage,‖ any term lacking a clear, art specific definition in the art would have to be 
construed solely on the basis of the specification. 380  Consistent with this approach, any 
time a court decided that two or more words constituted a single claim term it would be 
likely to construe the terms strictly in accordance with the specification.  This is 
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particularly likely in view of the Federal Circuit‘s own admission that such terms are 
often created by patent counsel, not inventors or workers in the field.381 
 The full Federal Circuit‘s most recent attempt to address claim construction 
embraces both views, contradictory as that may seem.  Phillips was expected to resolve 
the discordant trends in claim construction between cases that sought to establish an 
―ordinary meaning‖ for a term in the first instance without regard to the specification and 
those that suggested the specification was paramount.  While indicating that meanings 
appearing clearly from the specification and prosecution history should control, Phillips 
nonetheless stated that a court could effectively use any sources it wanted to, in any 
order, in attempting to arrive at a construction. 382  Hence, cases can still run the gamut 
from relying on dictionaries to rejecting them outright.  
 Introducing creativity and problem solving as elements of a person of ordinary 
skill‘s character consistent with KSR383 would once again shift this balance.  It seems to 
undercut any rationale for Vanderlande‘s holding that in the absence of an immediate, art 
specific meaning for a claim a person of skill in the art would feel bound to use only the 
patent‘s teaching to define it.  Rather, a court would have to analyze which inferences 
and creative steps the reader might take in reaching a full understanding of a patent.  At a 
minimum, it would seem that such persons would seek out available reference materials 
to determine the meaning of terms.  They would also seem likely, in the case of 
compound terms like ―glide surface,‖ to attempt to infer the meaning from the definitions 






Arriving at the central ruling in KSR did not require the Court to analyze 
―ordinary skill,‖ ―person of ordinary skill,‖ or ―person having ordinary skill.‖  The lack 
of rigorous review, or even cited authority, for its conclusion that possessing skill 
necessarily indicates possession of creativity reinforces the impression that these 
comments were a gratuitous afterthought.  The carelessness of these statements is 
confirmed by comparing them with a more rigorous study of the meaning of ―ordinary 
skill‖ both as a matter of construction and precedent.  The implications of a widespread 
implementation of KSR‘s views on the nature of ―persons of ordinary skill‖ are therefore 
quite disturbing.  Hopefully, confronted with the scope of these problems and issues, 
either the Court or Congress will take the steps necessary to ensure these comments do 
                                                 
381 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (―[C]ommonly the 
claims are drafted by the inventor's patent solicitor and they may even be drafted by the patent 
examiner in an examiner's amendment (subject to the approval of the inventor's solicitor).‖); see 
also Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Markman 
I). 
382 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
383 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741-42 (2007). 




not become the proverbial devil in the details.  Otherwise, all participants in patent law 
(inventors, prosecutors, examiners, litigators, and judges) will have to adjust their 
traditional views of ―ordinary skill‖ and ―persons having ordinary skill‖ to match these 
new, seemingly a priori views of the Court. 
 
 
